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Articles
Resolving the Subsidiary
Director's Dilemma
by
ERmc J. GouviN*
Introduction
Holding companies dominate our economy.1 In 1995, the ten
largest companies on the Fortune 500 owned an average of 62 subsidi-
aries each.2 Many subsidiary corporations, though owned entirely by
* Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.A.
1983, Cornell University; J.D. 1986, LL.M. 1990, Boston University School of Law. I thank
Jim Gardner, Don Korobkin, Elizabeth Lovejoy, Jay Mootz, and Bob Titus for their com-
ments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. In this article, the term "holding company" refers to the common situation where
a typically nonoperating parent corporation owns a number of operating subsidiaries. This
form of ownership plays a huge role in the U.S. and world economies. The vast majority of
the banking, insurance, transportation, communications, and securities firms in the U.S.
economy are subsidiaries of holding companies. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUc-
TURF OF THE CoIRoRA-rioN 277-81 (1976). The most famous examples of the holding
company form of ownership are the multinational conglomerates formed in the 1960s such
as L.T.V., Gulf & Western, and others. See id at 282; see also BURTON G. MALKIEL, A
RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET 58-65 (1990) (presenting a straightforward discus-
sion of how the conglomeration device works from a financial point of view).
2. This figure reflects corporate affiliates identified as "subsidiaries" or "non-U.S.
holdings" in the database. DIALOG, File No. 513 (Oct. 28, 1995) (searching Field "IR,"
or "Corporate Family Hierarchy"). The subsidiary figures for the Fortune top ten are:
General Motors, 91 subsidiaries; Ford Motor Company, 183 subsidiaries; Exxon, 44 subsid-
iaries; Wal-Mart Stores, 1 subsidiary; AT&T, 17 subsidiaries; General Electric, 72 subsidi-
aries; International Business Machines, 76 subsidiaries; Mobil Oil Corp., 55 subsidiaries;
Sears Roebuck and Company, 4 subsidiaries; and Philip Morris, 80 subsidiaries. These
figures may be somewhat inflated in that they include subsidiaries of subsidiaries in the
calculation. Looking only at subsidiaries whose immediate parent is one of the Fortune
ten, the average number of subsidiaries drops to 34.3 per corporation. Drawing on data
compiled in 1982, Phillip Blumberg noted that each of the 1000 largest U.S. industrial cor-
porations on average controlled 48 subsidiaries. PHILLiP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF COR-
PoRATE GROUPS: SUBSTANTIVE LAW xxxiii (1987) [hereinafter BLUMBERG, SuBsTANTIVE
LAW]; PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL LAW 463-
74 (1983) [hereinafter BLUMBERG, PROCEDURAL LAW].
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another corporation, are themselves gigantic corporate enterprises.
For example, Philip Morris, the tenth largest U.S. corporation,3 owns
such major businesses as the Miller Brewing Company, Kraft Foods,
and the Philip Morris tobacco manufacturing operating unit.
Although subsidiaries play a significant role in our economy,4 sur-
prisingly little has been written about the duties of their directors.5
Despite widespread acceptance of holding companies as common-
place business entities, several legal problems inherent in the holding
company form of ownership remain unresolved. Holding companies
raise legal dilemmas for subsidiary directors that are easier to ignore
than to resolve.
Like all corporate directors, the directors of subsidiaries are
bound by fiduciary duties. However, as Justice Frankfurter observed
3. In its 1995 annual survey of the 500 largest U.S. corporations, Fortune magazine
identified the following as the ten largest: (1) General Motors, (2) Ford Motor Company,
(3) Exxon, (4) Wal-Mart Stores, (5) AT&T, (6) General Electric, (7) International Busi-
ness Machines, (8) Mobil Oil Corporation, (9) Sears Roebuck and Company, and (10)
Philip Morris. The Fortune 500 Largest U.S. Corporations, FORTUNE, May 15, 1995, at F-1.
4. For a discussion of the huge role that subsidiaries play in world commerce, see
BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIvE LAW, supra note 2, at xxxii-xxxiii.
5. Since the 1920s and 1930s, little scholarly effort has been expended on the trouble-
some relationship between parent and subsidiary. The one modem example of exhaustive
scholarly effort on the subject of parent and subsidiary corporations is the multivolume
treatise PHILLIP I. BLUMBERO & KURT A. STRASSER, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS
(1992). That comprehensive work provides a thorough treatment of enterprise liability,
although it does not explicitly address the issues raised in this Article. Other than
Blumberg, commentary is scarce. What little has been written consists primarily of student
notes focusing on the problems of self-dealing when a subsidiary is not wholly owned. See,
e.g., Michael B. Goldberg, Note, The Fiduciary Duty of Parent to Subsidiary Corporation,
57 VA. L. REV. 1223 (1971); Robert D. Kodak, Comment, The Corporate Fiduciary Duty
Doctrine and the Requirement of Fairness in Parent-Subsidiary Relations, 76 DIcK. L. REV.
237 (1972); Steven F. Mones, Comment, Protection of Minority Shareholders in Parent-
Subsidiary Tender Offers: Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 729 (1984); Thomas
W. Walde, Parent-Subsidiary Relations in the Integrated Corporate System: A Comparison
of American and German Law, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 455 (1974); Note, Corporate Fiduci-
ary Doctrine in the Context of Parent-Subsidiary Relations, 74 YALE L.J. 338 (1964). Cf
Zenichi Shishido, Conflicts of Interest and Fiduciary Duties in the Operation of a Joint Ven-
ture, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1987). Other than articles dealing with the questions of when to
pierce the corporate veil of the subsidiary to hold the parent liable for torts and contracts
of the subsidiary, see, e.g., J.A. Bryant, Jr., Annotation, Liability of Corporation for Con-
tracts of Subsidiary, 38 A.L.R.3d 1102 (1971), and R.A. Horton, Annotation, Liability of
Corporation for Torts of Subsidiary, 7 A.L.R.3d 1343 (1966), the scholarly effort has fo-
cused on the economic efficiency of the subsidiary device, see RICHARD POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 379-82 (3d ed. 1986); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 110-11 (1985); Rich-
ard Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 509
(1976) [hereinafter Posner, The Rights of Creditors]; and Joseph H. Sommer, The Subsidi-
ary: Doctrine Without a Cause?, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 227 (1990).
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more than fifty years ago, "to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins
analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry."'6 In the context of the
parent-subsidiary relationship, a necessary inquiry is: To whom does
the subsidiary director owe the fiduciary duty? That simple question
defies a simple answer; it is not always clear to whom subsidiary direc-
tors owe their fiduciary duty.7 Case law leaves subsidiary directors
wondering whether their duty runs primarily to the parent corporation
as shareholder, to the subsidiary corporation itself as an entity, or
even to other constituencies such as creditors, regulators, employees,
and communities. 8
In most situations confronting subsidiary directors, the quandary
of figuring out who is the recipient of the fiduciary duty is of mere
academic interest. In the ordinary situation, one would assume that
the interests of the subsidiary corporation as an entity and the inter-
ests of the parent corporation as shareholder coincide, thereby mak-
ing further inquiry into the subsidiary director's fiduciary duty
uninteresting, if not altogether moot. Despite the strong intuitive ap-
peal of that typical scenario, however, in many cases the interests of
the wholly owned subsidiary as a corporate entity do not coincide with
the interests of the parent corporation as shareholder. 9
In many situations, the board of directors of the subsidiary corpo-
ration is not free to take action that is in the best interests of the sub-
6. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
7. Even the American Law Institute has trouble determining to whom corporate
directors owe their fiduciary duty. The drafters of the Principles of Corporate Governance
changed the term "duty of loyalty" to "duty of fair dealing" precisely because determining
the beneficiary of the duty of loyalty is so fraught with uncertainty. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Part V, introductory
note a, at 264 (Proposed Draft, Mar. 31, 1992) [hereinafter A.L.I. PRINCILE-S OF CORPO-
RATE GOVERNANCE].
8. The current confusion in the law of subsidiary corporations is not a recent devel-
opment. Corporate law relating to subsidiaries has always been unclear. Professor Ballan-
tine may have said it best when he observed more than 70 years ago that the doctrine of
subsidiary corporations is a "legal quagmire." Henry W. Ballantine, Separate Entity of
Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14 CAL. L. REv. 12, 15 (1925). Justice Cardozo was a
little more charitable in a famous quotation where he referred to the doctrine of parent
and subsidiary corporations as being "enveloped in the mists of metaphor." Berkey v.
Third Avenue Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
9. A recent case in which a holding company "looted" its subsidiary insurance com-
pany, allegedly to prop up the failing activities of its other subsidiaries, illustrates the point.
See John H. Kennedy, Monarch Life Sues Law Firm of Ex-Parent, BOSTON GLOBE, May 7,
1993, at 57. A Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Justice referred to the relationship
between the parent corporation and its subsidiary as "corporate child abuse." Christopher
Geehern, Suit Details Collapse of Monarch, SPRINGFIELD (MASS.) SUNDAY REPUBLICAN,
May 9, 1993, at D-1.
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sidiary as a corporation, but instead must do as the parent corporation
demands. For example, it is not unusual for subsidiaries to sell their
products at reduced prices to their parents, to buy goods and services
from their parents at inflated prices, to pay excessive management
fees to their parents, to declare excessive dividends, or to otherwise to
engage in transactions at the request of their parents that the subsidi-
aries never would have undertaken on their own.' 0 Therefore, the
boards of subsidiaries often engage in activities that serve only the
interests of the parent-even when corporate law imposes a duty on
the directors to act in the interests of other parties."
The split between the parent's interests and the interests of the
subsidiary can be especially pronounced when the subsidiary is a par-
ticipant in a highly regulated industry. Often the directors of the regu-
lated subsidiary will find themselves torn between a desire to make
decisions in the best interest of the subsidiary as an independent cor-
poration consistent with the larger regulartory scheme, and a
counterveiling desire to make decisions in accordance with the wishes
of the parent corporation. 12 Although these types of conflicts arise in
a number of situations, the following hypothetical from the banking
industry illustrates the subsidiary director's dilemma: X serves as a
director for M Bank, a commercial bank chartered by the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts. M Bank, in turn, is a wholly owned subsidi-
ary of Bank Holdings Company (BHC), a business corporation. BHC
requires that M Bank purchase all of its data processing services from
another wholly owned subsidiary of BHC even though independent
vendors offer the same services at a lower price. BHC also requires M
Bank to pay monthly "management fees" to BHC, even though BHC
provides few, if any, valuable services. Finally, BHC also owns
LeaseCo, a leasing firm that has run into serious financial difficulties
as a result of an economic downturn. The funds LeaseCo has at-
tracted from outside investors have been lost and LeaseCo is on the
10. Cf. Kieran J. Fallon, Note, Source of Strength or Source of Weakness?: A Critique
of the "Source-of-Strength" Doctrine in Banking Reform, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344, 1383
(1991) (illustrating various methods by which parent corporations take advantage of
subsidiaries).
11. See infra notes 38-54, 82-96, and accompanying text.
12. In the interest of full disclosure, see Ronald K.L. Collins, A Letter on Scholarly
Ethics, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 139 (1995), I should state for the record that in 1989 and 1990 I
represented a bank holding company against a wholly owned bank subsidiary in a situation
where the board of the subsidiary insisted that it was required to make decisions solely in
the best interest of the subsidiary, while the holding company insisted that the subsidiary
approve various transactions designed to help bail out the holding company. In the inter-
vening years I have come to appreciate the subsidiary board's position.
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verge of bankruptcy. BHC, the common shareholder of both LeaseCo
and M Bank, would be severely harmed by LeaseCo's economic col-
lapse. To shore up LeaseCo, BHC requests that M Bank lend money
to LeaseCo and issue a series of letters of credit in support of LeaseCo
deals.13
The dealings with BHC and LeaseCo strike Director X as inad-
visable. If M Bank were an independent company, Director X would
not approve the transactions. Nevertheless, X knows that she owes a
fiduciary duty to the shareholder, BHC. Recognizing this duty to the
shareholder, Director X votes for the requested transactions even
though she believes they are not in the best interests of M Bank as a
corporate entity.
Under current law, director X may discover that giving the share-
holder parent's desires priority over the corporate well-being of the
subsidiary can give rise to director liability. In the litigation that fol-
lowed the wave of bank failures in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
many directors faced personal liability for bank losses. Although they
had made decisions in the best interest of their sole shareholder, the
directors often found themselves the target of lawsuits instituted by
nonshareholder constituents involved in the corporate enterprise, in-
cluding the banking regulators, 14 customers,15 and other parties. 16
13. Assume for the sake of argument that the size of these transactions do not violate
the prohibitions of §§ 23A or 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c to 371c-1
(1994), but that the quality of the collateral may or may not meet the requirements of
those sections.
14. Subsidiary directors of banks may be subject to suit from the bank regulators on a
number of grounds, including cease and desist orders, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1994) (perma-
nent orders), § 1818(c) (1994) (temporary orders); imposition of civil money penalties, 12
U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2) (1994); removal or suspension, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) (1994); or any act of
gross negligence or other culpable conduct, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994). For a general dis-
cussion of director liability from regulation, see Norma Hildenbrand, D&O Liability: Ex-
pansion Via Regulation, 111 BANKING L.J. 365 (1994); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary
Duties' Demanding Cousin: Bank Director Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Prac-
tices, 63 GEG. WASH. L. REv. 175 (1995). In addition to these statutorily created powers,
some federal banking regulators have insisted that banks and their affiliated parties owe a
fiduciary duty to the federal deposit insurance agency. See Lawrence G. Baxter, Fiduciary
Issues in Federal Banking Regulation, 56 LAW & CoNrEMp. PRoBs. 7, 15-31 (1993).
15. Directors may be subject to suits from depositors, Hoehn v. Crews, 144 F.2d 665
(10th Cir. 1944), affld sub. nor. Garber v. Crews, 324 U.S. 200 (1945); Commercial Cotton
Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding that bank has "at
least [a] quasi-fiduciary" relationship with depositors); from beneficiaries of trusts for
which the bank served as trustee, 12 C.F.R. § 9 (1995); and, in some cases, from borrowers,
Barrett v. Bank of Am., 229 Cal. Rptr. 16,20-21 (Ct. App. 1986); Barnett Bank v. Hooper,
498 So. 2d 923, 925 (Fla. 1986). For a discussion of situations in which a bank might be
considered to have a fiduciary relationship with its customer, see Neils B. Schaumann, The
Lender as Unconventional Fiduciary, 23 SEroN HALL L. Ruv. 21, 40-43 (1992).
The most feared of lawsuits were those by the FDIC as receiver of the
failed bank asserting claims belonging to the bank for breaches of fi-
duciary duty arising out of the directors' failure to make decisions in
the best interests of the bank. 17
Such directors often faced personal liability. Although well-ad-
vised directors were covered by directors' and officers' liability insur-
ance, the types of claims brought against them in these situations were
often excluded from coverage. 18 Since the typical small bank director
is unlikely to be a banking professional,' 9 the imposition of personal
16. Directors may be subject to suit from the insurance company that bonds the bank.
FDIC v. Boone, 361 F. Supp. 133 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
17. See, e.g., McVane v. FDIC, 44 F.3d 1127, 1131 (2d Cir. 1995); Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Walde, 18 F.3d 943, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1994); FDIC v. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. 533 (D.
Utah 1991), rev'd, 957 F.2d 786 (10th Cir.), rev'd, 967 F2d 443 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
For a general discussion of suits by regulators based on claims against directors, see James
T. Pitts et al., FDIC/RTC Suits Against Bank and Thrift Officers and Directors-Why Now,
What's Left?, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 2087, 2094-2102 (1995).
18. Although the FDIC officially denies that it sues all deep pockets, Alfred J.T.
Byrne & Judith Bailey, FDIC Addresses Three D&O Lawsuit Issues, ABA BANKING J. 47
(Oct. 1992), it is widely believed that the FDIC often sues directors with the intent of
recovering against existing director and officer liability insurance policies. R. Patrick
Flynn, Funds For the S&L Bailout: FDIC Recovery on D&O Liability Policies of Failed
Depository Institutions, FICC Q. 159 (Winter 1992). FDIC officials say that the agency
sues at least one director of a failed institution in about 20% of all bank failures. Byrne &
Bailey, supra. Other sources put the figure of FDIC suits against directors of failed banks
at about 50%. ROBERT E. BARNETT, RESPONSIBILITIES AND LIABILITIES OF BANK AND
BANK HOLDING COMPANY DIRECTORS 72 (1992). In many situations the specific claims
asserted by the FDIC fall into the standard insurance exclusions for violations of regula-
tions or for suits by the insured against itself. See M. Mazen Anbari, Comment, Banking
on a Bailout: Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Policy Exclusions in the Context
of the Savings and Loan Crisis, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 547 (1992); Flynn, supra, at 172-78; Is
D&O a Leaky Life Buoy?, ABA BANKING J. 56 (Jan. 1992); see also Chandler v. American
Casualty Co., 833 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Ark. 1993) (claim by Resolution Trust Corporation
also within exclusion); Abifadel v. Cigna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 910 (Ct. App. 1992)
(regulatory agency directives do not constitute covered claims). For a general discussion of
directors' and officers' liability, see Bennett L. Ross, Protecting Corporate Directors and
Officers: Insurance and Other Alternatives, 40 VAND. L. REv. 775 (1987); Edgar W. Arm-
strong, Jr., Keeping Officers, Directors Protected as Insurers Pull Back, CORP. CASHFLOW
30 (Apr. 1992); Stanley M. Huggins, Protecting Your Board, ABA BANKING J. 34 (June
1992).
19. Jerry Hawke, current Undersecretary of Treasury and former partner at Arnold &
Porter, describes the typical small bank director as:
likely to be a local businessman or businesswoman who is neither an expert in
banking nor a professional manager. Very often the director is an entrepreneur
who has been successful in his or her own business. Most small banks do not take
on directors for their business management expertise. Rather the principal crite-
rion is the likelihood that the director will bring business to the bank.
John D. Hawke, Jr., The Limited Role of Directors in Assuring the Soundness of Banks,
1987 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 285, 286-87. The typical large bank directors often "are pro-
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liability for obeying the demands of the sole shareholder often comes
as a rude awakening.20
Although the fiduciary Catch-22 for bank directors can be espe-
cialy brutal, the directors of all wholly owned subsidiaries confront
similar dilemmas. Directors who find themselves torn between two
duties face three equally unpleasant options: first, the directors can
take action that is in the best interest of the subsidiary as a corporate
entity and risk either removal from their directorships by the parent-
shareholder or personal liability to the parent-shareholder for breach
of fiduciary duty; second, the directors can take action that is in the
best interest of the parent-shareholder and expose themselves to per-
sonal liability in suits by nonshareholder constituencies, such as regu-
lators; or third, the directors can take no action, resign their positions
and wash their hands of the situation. Only the last option leaves
them free of their dilemma, but simultaneously neglects the larger
problem and shirks their duties. The law should not leave directors
with such unsatisfactory choices.
This article examines the subsidiary director's dilemma and dem-
onstrates that traditional models of corporate structure are not ade-
quate for the subsidiary-parent situation described above. I argue that
the law should recognize the special relationship between a parent
and its subsidiary and adopt agency principles to address the question
of subsidiary directors' duties within the larger corporate enterprise.
Part I examines the current state of the law regarding the duties of
directors of subsidiary corporations and finds that Delaware law
seems to be pointing in the right direction by imposing a duty on sub-
sidiary directors to act in the best interest of the parent. The second
part of the article focuses on a larger problem: If subsidiary directors
owe a duty only to the parent corporation, what happens to the duties
that corporate directors generally owe to nonshareholders, including
to the subsidiary corporation itself? The third part examines four pos-
sible approaches to resolving the subsidiary director's dilemma. The
article concludes that subsidiary directors are in an untenable position
fessional managers who are top executives for the bank's corporate customers and thus are
more sophisticated in complex business transactions than the small bank director." Id.
20. Because of the personal exposure facing directors, banks and other corporations
are finding the recruitment of qualified directors increasingly difficult. Dan Cordtz & Jen-
nifer Reingold, The Vanishing Director, Copp. FIN. 34 (Fall 1993); Lauryn Franzoni, How
To Help Your Directors Stay on Board, BANKING WK. 1 (Feb. 2, 1992); Barbara A. Rehm,
Fearing Lawsuits, Bank Directors Take a Hike, BANKING WK. 1 (Jan. 6, 1992); Fred Vogel-
stein, For Some Bank Directors, 1991 Law Is the Last Straw, BANKING WK. 1 (Dec. 7,
1992); Liability Concerns Shrink Pool of Directors, ABA BANKING J. 105 (Oct. 1992).
and should not be expected to act independently of the holding com-
pany. Instead, agency principles should require that the subsidiary di-
rectors owe a duty only to the parent corporation and that any duties
owed to nonshareholders be imposed directly on the holding
company.
I. To Whom Do Subsidiary Directors Owe Their
Fiduciary Duties?
Although the concept of subsidiary corporations is now more
than one hundred years old,2 ' clear guidance for the directors of sub-
sidiary corporations remains elusive. Two recent efforts to clarify the
underlying precepts of corporate governance, the A.B.A.'s Corporate
Director's Guidebook,22 and the A.L.I.'s Principles of Corporate Gov-
ernance,23 make no special mention of the role of directors of subsidi-
aries.24 Perhaps this silence indicates that the duties of subsidiary
directors are the same as those for corporate directors generally.
Well-established law in Delaware and other jurisdictions holds
that the directors of corporations owe fiduciary duties to both the cor-
poration and its shareholders.25 The Delaware Supreme Court has re-
cently stated that these two duties are "of equal and independent
21. For most of the nineteenth century, corporations were generally prohibited from
owning the stock of other corporations. In 1888, New Jersey became the first state to
permit corporations to acquire the shares of other corporations. BLUMBERG, SUBSTAN-
TIVE LAW, supra note 2, at 55. The subsidiary idea changed the face of American business.
Corporations were formed with the intent of carrying on some of their activities through
subsidiaries or to expand through the acquisition of other corporations. For a concise his-
tory of the development of the subsidiary idea, see id. at 55-60.
22. Section of Business Law, American Bar Association, Corporate Director's Guide-
book-1994 Edition, 49 Bus. LAW. 1243 (1994).
23. A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 7.
24. In defense of the Principles of Corporate Governance, it is possible that the rea-
son it omits explicit discussion of directors of subsidiaries is because of its limited subject
matter scope. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, An Overview of the Principles of Corporate
Governance, 48 Bus. LAW. 1271, 1272 (1993). The Principles do discuss the duties of con-
trolling shareholders, including specifically matters affecting parent and subsidiary. A.L.I.
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, § 5.11. Nevertheless, the Princi-
ples are silent on the role of the subsidiary directors.
25. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del.
1993) ("the directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its
shareholders.") (quoting Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280
(Del. 1989) (citations omitted); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (directors
owe "fundamental fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders") (footnote
and citations omitted); Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) ("Corporate officers and
directors ... stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its shareholders.").
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significance," 26 but case law reveals that the directors' duty to the cor-
poration as an entity usually predominates over their duty to the
shareholders. Only in certain situations will the duty to the sharehold-
ers predominate over the duty to the corporation.27 If the law of par-
ent and subsidiary follows corporate law generally, it would appear
that in some situations the subsidiary board should make decision in
the best interests of the parent corporation as shareholder, and at
other times the directors should take action in the best interest of the
subsidiary as a corporation.
The courts have failed to articulate clearly the guidance necessary
to permit boards to know with certainty when they owe their primary
duty to one corporate constituency or another. History offers only
limited help on the matter of which interests take precedence.2 The
classic case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.29 stated that "a business cor-
poration is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. °30 The Dodge case gives us the hornbook rule that di-
rectors owe their duty primarily to the shareholders,3' although the
case itself permitted directors to use the interests of the corporation as
a "proxy" for shareholder interests in the ordinary situation.32
26. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993).
27. At yet other times a duty to third parties deserves primacy. See infra notes 82-133
and accompanying text. But see John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Coopera-
tion, Relationship Managemen and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78 MINN.
L. REv. 1443 (1994) (arguing that the "governance tug-of-war" between various corporate
constituencies is outdated and must be replaced with a system based on cooperation and
dialogue in order to insure long-term financial viability for public corporations).
28. During the nineteenth century, while corporate law was in its infancy, cases raising
the issue of fiduciary duties owed by a director to the corporation were rare, although
some dicta suggest that such a duty existed. See EDWIN MEmUCK DODD, AMERICAN Busi-
N.ss ComoRATIoNS UNTIL 1860, at 70-73 (1954) (discussing Attorney General v. Utica
Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Ch. 371 (N.Y. Ch. 1817), in which a New York equity court suggested that
"the persons who... exercise the corporate powers may, in their character of trustees, be
accountable to this court, for fraudulent breach of trust," and Gray v. Portland Bank, 3
Mass. 364 (1807), in which the plaintiff contended that the corporation was a trustee for its
shareholders).
29. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
30. Id at 684.
31. The Dodge rule was articulated as follows: "The board of directors should ... be
regarded as representative of the body of shareholders, exercising authority derived from
them, and responsible in a fiduciary character to them." ROBERT H. STEVENS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 646 (2d ed. 1949). In their famous book identify-
ing and discussing the implications of the split between ownership interests and manage-
ment interests in the corporation, Berle and Means articulated this duty as well. ADOLPH
A. BERLE, JR. & GARINER C. MEANS, Ti MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY 220-32 (1932).
32. 170 N.W. at 684. The Dodge court clearly held shareholder interests to be the
directors' primary responsibility, but muddied the waters by proceeding on the assumption
Subsequent case law has made it clear that a director's fiduciary
duty runs to the shareholders as a class, and not to individual share-
holders in their personal capacity. For example, in the 1933 case of
Goodwin v. Agassiz, 33 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
found that a corporate president or director who traded on inside in-
formation did not breach a fiduciary duty to a specific shareholder. In
reaching that conclusion, the court reified the corporation and found
the insider owed his duty to that artificial person, not to individual
shareholders. 34 Central to the reasoning of the case are the ideas that
the corporation is an entity that can be harmed, and that harm to a
shareholder does not necessarily mean harm to the corporation.35
The Goodwin court's view of the corporation represents a depar-
ture from the Dodge view. In Dodge, the interests of the corporation
are employed to figure out the interests of the shareholders, while in
Goodwin the corporation's interests are seen as somewhat independ-
ent and potentially different from shareholder interests.
Although the older case law was not crystal clear, it fostered the
rule that, in the general operation of the corporation, when no special
circumstances are present, the directors owe a duty to both the corpo-
that whatever is in the best interests of the "corporation" is also in the best interest of its
shareholders. The court's belief in the identity of interests of the shareholders and the
corporation is well illustrated by its statement in a part of the opinion refusing to interfere
with the board's decision to pursue a business expansion plan: "assuming further that the
plan and policy and the details agreed upon were for the best ultimate interest of the
company and therefore of its shareholders .... " Id. at 684.
33. 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933).
34. Id. at 660. In the language of the court:
The directors of a commercial corporation stand in a relation of trust to the cor-
poration and are bound to exercise the strictest good faith in respect to its prop-
erty and business. The contention that directors also occupy the position of
trustee toward individual stockholders in the corporation is plainly contrary to
repeated decisions of this court and cannot be supported.
Id. (citations omitted). Finding no harm to the corporate person, the court declined to
impose a duty on the insider to the shareholder. Id. at 661. The court did state that under
special circumstances, the insider might have had an "equitable responsibility" to disclose
the inside information to the shareholder. Id. Buying stock on the stock exchange, how-
ever, was not one of those situations. On the other hand, in face-to-face negotiations, a
director might be required to disclose. Id. Other cases decided in the early twentieth cen-
tury seem to echo the "special circumstances" test, although in those cases the facts in the
plaintiffs' favor were quite compelling. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 425 (1909)
(duty imposed on buyer engaged in face-to-face dealing that was cleary deceptive); Hotch-
kiss v. Fischer, 16 P.2d 531 (1932) (duty imposed on corporate insider who took advantage
of an unsophisticated widow in face-to-face dealings).
35. For a discussion and criticism of these cases, see BERLE & MEANS, supra note 31,
at 223-26.
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ration and its shareholders; 36 however, in ordinary situations, the in-
terests of the corporation and its shareholders would coincide, and
thus the directors should be given deference in deciding what is in the
best interests of the corporation.3 7 Over the years, however, the di-
rector's duty to the corporation in the ordinary situation has taken on
a life of its own and no longer serves merely as a proxy for duty to the
shareholders. In more recent cases, directors owe a duty to a "corpo-
ration" that is more than just the sum of its shareholders. In this view,
the interests of the corporation and the interests of the shareholders
may diverge. Two celebrated Delaware cases support the discretion of
directors under the business judgment rule to make the best decision
for the corporation, even if the shareholders would have preferred
other action.
A. Directors Generally Owe a Duty to the Corporation
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,38 Unocal received an
unsolicited tender offer from T. Boone Pickens structured as a coer-
cive two-step deal.39 Unocal's board determined that Pickens's offer
was not in the best interests of either the corporation or its sharehold-
ers, and implemented a self-tender plan designed to make Pickens's
tender offer almost impossible to consummate.40 The Delaware
Supreme Court ultimately upheld the defensive action of the Unocal
board.41 The court found that the Unocal board did not act solely or
36. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
37. See, eg., Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
38. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
39. Pickens had a reputation for acquiring companies cheaply, breaking them up, and
selling off the pieces at high prices. Id. at 949. The first step of the transaction called for
Pickens to acquire a controlling interest in the company at $54 per share, a premium over
the market price, but arguably far short of the intrinsic value of the company, which was
approximately $75 per share. Id. at 949-51. At the same time, Pickens also announced the
back end of the deal, which required that Unocal be merged into a Mesa Petroleum entity
with the remaining Unocal shareholders receiving high risk securities with a face value of
$54. ld. at 949. For various reasons, front-loaded offers are comparatively rare today. See
ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATION FINANCE 938 (2d ed. 1989) (citing reasons for the
declining use of front loaded offers).
40. Unocal's ingenious defense wiped out Mesa's financing commitments. Roughly
speaking, the plan worked as follows: upon the happening of certain triggering events, e.g.,
ownership of a certain percentage of Unocal stock by Pickens, Unocal would make a
tender for the rest of its shares at $72 per share, excluding the shares held by Mesa. Uno-
cal 493 A.2d at 951. The "All Holders Rule" for self-tenders has since eliminated defenses
like Unocal's because it now requires the offer to be open to all holders of the class. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-10 (1995).
41. Interestingly, the Delaware Court of Chancery held for Mesa Petroleum, but was
reversed by the Delaware Supreme Court. Unoca4 493 A.2d at 946. It should be noted
primarily out of a desire to perpetuate themselves in office, but in-
stead had reasonable grounds for believing a danger to corporate pol-
icy and effectiveness existed, and that their response bore a
reasonable relation to the threat posed.42
Implicit in the Unocal holding is the understanding that the direc-
tors are primarily responsible for running the corporation's business. 43
Thus, a board can make decisions in the best interests of the corpora-
tion even if the shareholders would have preferred other courses of
action. In reaching this conclusion, Unocal necessarily implies that
the corporation is more than just the sum of its shareholders. 44
The idea that the interests of the corporation can take precedence
over the interests of the shareholders was given further support by
Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc.45 In that case, Time's
board rebuffed an uninvited bid from Paramount with the "just say
no" defense.46 Time's board took action to consummate an already
pending combination with Warner Brothers to prevent Time's share-
holders from being able to choose between the Time-Warner combi-
nation and the Paramount tender offer.47 Paramount and Time
shareholders challenged Time's actions as a breach of the duty owed
that Chancellor Carolyn Berger heard the case in the chancery court and the Supreme
Court opinion reversing her was written by Judge Andrew Moore. In 1994, in a politically
charged appointments process, Chancellor Berger replaced Judge Moore on the Delaware
Supreme Court. Richard B. Schmitt, Delaware Judge Is Seen as Investors' Friend, WALL
ST. J., July 7, 1994, at B2. One can only speculate whether the change in court personnel
will result in a change in the law.
42. Unocal 493 A.2d at 954-55.
43. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991 & Supp. 1992) ("The business and
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors .... "); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984);
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del. 1984).
44. The court stated that, in evaluating the threat to the corporation, the directors
could consider the effects on nonshareholder constituencies, including creditors, customers,
employees, and the community. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. This was not the first time that
Delaware courts had recognized that in some situations corporate directors could take ac-
tion protecting nonshareholder constituents. See infra notes 100-15 and accompanying
text.
45. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989)
46. Time's board based its refusal on its belief that the offer was inadequate, condi-
tional, failed to consider long-term prospects, and posed a threat to the "Time Culture."
Id. at 1147-49.
47. In light of mounting pressure from Paramount's increasingly rich offers, the Time
board was reluctant to submit approval of the Time-Warner deal to Time's shareholders
because in all likelihood they would have rejected it in favor of the Paramount tender
offer. In order to avoid shareholder approval of the transaction, Time and Warner recast
their agreement as an outright acquisition of Warner by Time. Id. at 1148. Under relevant
law and the New York Stock Exchange rules, such an acquisition did not require approval
by Time's shareholders.
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by Tune directors to Time shareholders.48 The Delaware Supreme
Court, however, upheld the Time board's actions.49 The court stated
that the board, in making its determination about what is in the best
interest of the corporation, could take into consideration factors
above and beyond the maximization of short-term shareholder
interests.50
The Time opinion rests firmly on the premise that the corporation
is an entity in its own right whose interests are not always identical
with the interests of its shareholders.51 Statements in the opinion such
48. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the board had a duty to facilitate the reali-
zation of the large gains promised by the Paramount offer by letting Time's shareholders
vote on the deal. Id. at 1149. The existence of such a right of the shareholders to decide
was suggested by two cases in the late 1980's. In City Capital Associates v. Interco Inc.,
551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988), and Grand
Metropolitan PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988), the Chancery Court
enjoined the use of poison pills and ordered the redemption of those pills on the grounds
that the all-cash, all-shares tender offers could not constitute a sufficient threat to share-
holder interests to justify board action that would permanently foreclose the shareholders's
opportunity to accept the offers.
49. Although Paramount argued that Time's board could not pass the Unocal test
because the Paramount all-cash, all-shares offer could not constitute a "threat" for Unocal
purposes, the court found that Paramount's formulation of a "threat" under the Unocal
test was too narrow. Unocal 571 A.2d at 1153. The court found that situations other than
the coercive two-step merger at issue in Unocal could be covered by the rule. Id. at 1152.
50. The court specifically included in the list of appropriate nonshareholder interests
such things as illegality, impact on constituencies, and risk of nonconsummation. Id. at
1153; see also infra notes 100-15 and accompanying text. Because the board found several
threats to Time posed by Paramount's offer, including (1) confusion over the strategic
value of the combination with Warner, (2) conditions on the Paramount deal that made the
competing proposals impossible to compare, and (3) confusion in the shareholder voting
process because of the timing of the offer and the proxy materials, the Court was willing to
defer to the judgment of the board to restructure the Warner transaction in order to avoid
a shareholder vote. Id. Having established a reasonable perception of a threat to corpo-
rate policy, the court found the second prong of the Unocal test satisfied (1) because Time
and Warner mere merely carrying forward an already existing plan in altered form and (2)
because Paramount could still make an offer on the combined company.
51. See Trevor S. Norwitz, "The Metaphysics of Time": A Radical Corporate Vision,
46 Bus. LAW. 377, 384-86 (1991) (suggesting that the Tune court recognized a corporate
entity to which the board of directors owed its fiduciary duties). On the other hand, some
commentators have doubts about what Time means and whether it gives any indication of a
broader theory of corporateness in Delaware. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, The
Case Beyond Time, 45 Bus. LAW. 2105 (1990):
Indeed, how can one read Delaware's takeover decisions of the past few years
and see anything but a gallant but still incomplete struggle to come to grips with
the larger takeover phenomenon. Thus, while in result Tune represents a swing
back towards empowering management to protect the corporate enterprise, an
unwillingness to jettison the role of takeovers as important accountability instru-
ments in corporate governance is likely to remain.
Id. at 2124.
as: "[D]irectors, generally, are obliged to chart a course for a corpora-
tion which is in its best interests .. "52 illustrate the concept of the
corporation as an independent entity that has interests separate from
the interests of the shareholders. Furthermore, the court explicitly ac-
knowledged that the corporation's interests and the shareholders' in-
terests do not always coincide when it said: "The fiduciary duty to
manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a time frame
for achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not be delegated
to the stockholders. '53
For most board decisions, therefore, the default rule appears to
be that the directors owe their duties to the corporation as an entity.
Although assessing the corporation's interests necessarily requires
evaluation of shareholder interests, directors ordinarily do not owe
their primary duty to the shareholders. Directors may make decisions
in the corporation's best interests even when those decisions do not
maximize short term shareholder value.54 Cases arising in other con-
texts, however, make clear that this general rule has exceptions.
B. Sometimes Directors Owe a Duty to Shareholders
Although ordinarily corporate directors are duty-bound to take
action in the best interests of the corporation, in certain circum-
stances, such as the sale-of-control context, directors owe their duties
primarily to the shareholders. For example, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.55 requires that the directors take action
to maximize shareholder wealth when it is clear that the corporation is
going to be sold.5 6
52. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 1154 (emphasis added). This position infuriated some shareholder activists,
especially Robert A.G. Monks, president of Institutional Shareholder Partners, Inc., who
felt that the Time-Warner transaction deprived shareholders of their voice in corporate
democracy and only served to entrench management and make them less accountable. See
MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA 107-14 (1991) (written by a former Bush
administration Treasury Department official, who saw Time as wrong-headed because it
insulated management by preventing the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis from forcing
them to maximize shareholder (and therefore societal) value); ROBERT A.G. MONKS &
NELL MINOW, POWER AND ACCOUNTABILrry 93-107 (1991).
54. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150.
55. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
56. In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated a "lock-up" option granted
by Revlon to Forstmann Little & Co., a white knight bidder. Forstmann made the lock-up
option a condition of its friendly bid in response to the hostile takeover by Ron Perelman.
Id. at 178-79. The option, which effectively killed a bidding contest for Revlon, would have
allowed Forstmann to acquire two of Revlon's most desirable divisions for $100 to $175
million less than their appraised value if another bidder acquired more than 40% of Rev-
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The Revlon court held that, in the change-of-control context, the
directors' duty to the shareholders supersedes their general duty
under Unocal to act in the corporation's best interests.57 The Dela-
ware Supreme Court recently followed Revlon in Paramount Commu-
nications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.58 The QVC court read Revlon to
impose special duties on directors in all sale-of-control situations
where shareholders are not adequately protected by the ordinary fidu-
Ion's shares. Id. The court found that, in offering the lock-up to Forstmann, Revlon's
board had breached its duty to its shareholders. Id. at 182-84. The court stated that while
the Unocal decision sanctions the board's power to enact plans designed to frustrate a bust-
up acquisition or a coercive offer, once a sale becomes inevitable, the directors' duties shift
from being focused primarily on protecting the corporation to instead acting to maximize
shareholder values by ensuring a fair auction of the corporation:
The Revlon board's authorization permitting management to negotiate a merger
or buyout with a third party was a recognition that the company was for sale. The
duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corpo-
rate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockhold-
ers' benefit.
Id at 182. Some commentators have suggested that if "Revlon duties" ever did exist they
no longer do because Delaware has moved toward a unitary standard for evaluating board
conduct. See Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law
after QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 Bus.
LAW. 1593 (1994). As the authors themselves admit, however, their interpretation is one
among many, and the current state of Delaware law remains a mystery. Id. at 1594-96.
57. 506 A.2d at 182. Recognizing a duty to maximize shareholder value in the sale-of-
control context raises some tough questions. The most difficult issue is determining when
the directors' duty switches from protecting the corporation's interests to maximizing
shareholder value. In Time, the court stated that Revlon duties are implicated in at least
two situations: (1) when a company initiates the auction process by putting itself in play; or
(2) when, in response to a bidder's offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks
an alternative transaction involving break up of the company. Paramount Communica-
tions Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150. In Time, the court refused to impose Revlon
duties on transactions that resulted in putting the corporation "in play" or "up for sale" if
the transaction did not also involve the abandonment of long term plans. Id. at 1150-51. In
addition, the Time court held that "[d]irectors are not obligated to abandon a deliberately
conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis
to sustain the corporate strategy." Id. at 1154.
Another question raised by the existence of Revlon duties concerns how the board
should conduct the auction of the corporation once the switch of duties has occurred. This
question has been addressed in the cases of Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559
A.2d 1261, 1286-87 (Del. 1988) (concluding that there is no prescribed formula for auctions
as long as the board's primary purpose is to enhance the bidding process for the sharehold-
ers's benefit); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989)
(noting the board's "active and direct role in the sale process"); and In re RJR Nabisco
Shareholders Litigation, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194, at
91,715 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (court deferred to board in selecting one of two substan-
tially similar bids under business judgment rule and found that Revlon did not impose
additional requirements on the auction process). Further analysis of the auction process is
beyond the scope of this article.
58. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
ciary duties owed to them by the directors. 59 Viewed solely as a sale-
of-control case, the QVC opinion's focus on shareholder rights over
independent corporate rights is neither surprising nor inconsistent
with previous cases because the interests of the corporation as a cor-
poration were not affected in the underlying transaction while cleary
the interests of the shareholders were.60
C. General Corporate Duties in the Subsidiary Context
Even if we could identify with certainty the duties owed by direc-
tors generally, a moment's reflection reveals that the transplantation
of ordinary director duties to the wholly owned subsidiary context is
unrealistic. The duties imposed on directors generally do not make
sense within the special case of the parent-subsidiary relationship.
The parent corporation's domination over the affairs of the subsidiary
makes it unlikely that subsidiary directors will ever take any non-
shareholder interests into account, including the interests of the "cor-
poration," assuming that such an entity has interests that differ from
the shareholder's interests.61 Even though, under Revlon, the share-
holder's interest should take precedence only in the sale-of-control
context, directors of subsidiary corporations will be hard-pressed to
make decisions in the best interests of the "corporation" that are con-
trary to the interests and orders of its shareholder-parent.
Torn between two conflicting duties, the directors of subsidiary
corporations face the "horizontal conflict" problem identified by Law-
rence Mitchell.62 Horizontal conflicts occur when directors owe duties
59. Id. at 46-48. In an apparent narrowing of Time, the QVC court held that "Rev-
Ion... does not hold that an inevitable dissolution or 'break-up' is necessary" to shift the
directors' duties. Id. at 46. The QVC court did not see this as inconsistent with the Time
holding because the Time opinion said that the two enumerated instances when Revlon was
implicated were prefaced by the phrase "generally speaking and without excluding other
possibilities." Id. at 49. The QVC case was apparently one of these "other possibilities."
60. On the other hand, some commentators have suggested that QVC is more than
just another Revlon-type case and is instead a reassessment of the general standard of care.
See Paul L. Regan, The Unimportance of Being Earnest. Paramount Rewrites the Rules for
Enhanced Scrutiny in Corporate Takeovers, 46 HAsTINGs LJ. 125 (1994) (suggesting that
QVC indicates judicial encroachment on director discretion that has historically been pro-
tected by the business judgment rule); Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 56 (suggesting
that QVC and other recent cases indicate a new unified standard of director action that
does not hinge on the type of transaction).
61. As a matter of organizational theory, subsidiaries tend to be "instruments," that
is, they exercise little autonomy and are dominated by an external coalition. See HENRY
MINTZBERG, POWER IN AND AROUND ORGANIZATIONS 308-09, 329 (1983).
62. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Cor-
porate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REv. 579, 603-07 (1992).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [V'ol. 47
January 1996] RESOLVING THE SUBSIDIARY DIRECTOR'S DILEMMA 303
to more than one constituency and are charged with making sure that
all the constituencies get their due, even though the interests of the
shareholders tend to dominate the decision-making process. 63 As
Professor Mitchell has pointed out, although the law has developed
several methods to protect the corporation against director self-deal-
ing, there are few mechanisms in place to insure that directors prop-
erly discharge their duties to nonshareholder constituencies in a
horizontal conflict situation.64
Horizontal conflicts arise as a result of the interplay of several
threads of corporate law. Directors are supposed to act in the best
interests of the corporation 6s and the corporation consists of more
than just the sum of its shareholders.6 However, to discourage self-
dealing, only shareholders have standing to derivatively sue directors
for breaches of duty to the corporation.67 Logically, shareholders are
unlikely to bring a derivative action for the protection of "corporate"
interests unless their own interests are sufficiently affected.68 Conse-
63. Id.
64. Mitchell refers to self-dealing as a "vertical conflict." Id. at 591. For example,
derivative suits are useful mechanisms to keep vertical conflicts in check because they al-
low shareholders to initiate an action to compel the directors to bring a legal action on
behalf of the corporation and in some situations permit shareholders to prosecute the ac-
tion without the involvement of the directors. 13 WLLAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5941.10 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1991).
65. See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 44, 52-53, and accompanying text.
67. A.L.I. PRiNCIPLEs OF CORPORATE GovERNANCE, supra note 7, § 7.02 (authoriz-
ing holders of "equity securities" (including securities convertible into equity) and in some
cases directors, to commence and maintain derivative actions). Traditionally, convertible
security holders were denied standing. See Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 276
(E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 531 F.2d 1234 (3d Cir. 1976). But see Hoff v. Sprayregan, 339 F.
Supp. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Mere creditors traditionally have fared even worse than con-
vertible security holders. See Haberman v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d
1032, 1061 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (bondholders have no standing to sue derivatively),
modified, 750 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1988), appeal dismissed, 488 U.S. 805 (1988).
68. It has been argued that the U.S. system of state-level corporate law has a built-in
dynamic that produces statutes catering to shareholder interests to the exclusion of non-
shareholder interests. Lucian Bebchuk has demonstrated that although economically effi-
cient (and therefore socially desirable) statutes would take into account the interests of
shareholders and nonshareholders alike, the interstate competition for corporate charters
results in the development of statutes that appeal to the people who choose where to incor-
porate, and those people will choose laws that maximize shareholder value. Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1485 (1992). The areas of corporate law that
have significant nonshareholder interests, but which for competitive reasons are given
short shrift, include regulation of takeover bids and proxy contests, protection of creditors,
regulation of corporate disclosure, and protection of constituencies other than providers of
capital. Id. at 1486-93.
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quently, because nonshareholder constituents of the corporation have
no effective method for holding directors accountable when directors
fail to discharge their duties appropriately in the horizontal conflict
situation, their interests tend to be protected only when they coincide
with the interests of the shareholders.
The significance of this dynamic is not lost on directors generally,
and subsidiary directors doubtlessly understand this mechanism with
particular clarity. They understand that ultimate control of the corpo-
ration rests with the shareholders, who can either sell their shares to
other investors or vote different directors into office. The directors
also understand that the shareholders are the only group that can sue
the board on behalf of the corporation. This centralization of power
in the shareholders focuses director attention on shareholder interests
to the exclusion of other interests.69 As Professor Mitchell has ob-
served, the mismatch between the duty owed to all the constituents of
the corporation and an enforcement mechanism that allows only
shareholders to bring derivative actions causes nonshareholder con-
stituents to bear more than their share of the risk of detrimental direc-
tor action.70
While Professor Mitchell recognized that horizontal conflicts may
occur in any corporation, they are especially severe in context of the
wholly owned subsidiary. If subsidiary directors owe the same duties
as directors of corporations generally, the subsidiary directors may
often encounter horizontal conflicts on a regular basis. Additionally,
unlike the directors of a publicly traded corporation whose sharehold-
ers may be widely scattered, poorly organized, and more likely to sell
their stock than to bring a derivative suit, the directors of the wholly
owned subsidiary have their one and only shareholder looking over
their shoulders on a regular basis. Since the parent entirely controls
the subsidiary's management,71 it is unrealistic to expect the subsidi-
ary directors to act solely in the best interests of the subsidiary corpo-
ration even though such action would ordinarily be required for
corporate directors.72 Instead of requiring these directors to behave
as if the subsidiary were an independent entity, the law should be
69. Mitchell, supra note 62, at 605-07.
70. In effect, the mismatch produces negative economic externalities that are borne
by the nonshareholder constituents. Mitchell, supra note 62, at 606; see also Jonathan R.
Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Funda-
mental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 182 n.34 (implicitly acknowledging the
existence of externalities in this situation).
71. EISENBERO, supra note 1, at 299-300.
72. See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
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more realistic and allow them to do the bidding of the parent or share-
holder. Allowing this behavior requires a special rule of corporate
law, however, because directors may not normally place shareholder
interests ahead of corporate interests.73
Historically, the law has treated a parent corporation and its sub-
sidiaries as independent entities. To provide a "[w]orking chart of
proper parent and subsidiary corporation management," a treatise on
parent and subsidiary corporations written more than sixty years ago
unequivocally stated: "The subsidiary's directors ... must, of course,
run the business in its own interest. They must not be improvident
with its resources even though their action may, for extraneous rea-
sons, benefit the parent corporation."74 Implicit in this statement is a
conception of the parent and the subsidiary as separate legal entities,
just as all corporations are juridical persons separate and distinct from
their shareholders.
As courts, commentators, and practitioners have begun to accept
a more sophisticated view of corporate enterprise, rigid adherence to
the independent-entity model of corporate affiliates has become less
common. Yet despite the growing belief that nineteenth century cor-
porate theory has become anachronistic in the modem world of com-
plex corporate groups,75 cases dealing with subsidiary corporations
continue to draw on the traditional independent-entity paradigm with-
out taking meaningful countenance of the special situation of subsidi-
aries. For example, in Capital Parks, Inc. v. Southeastern Advertising
and Sales System, Inc.,76 the Fifth Circuit held that a plaintiff's right of
first refusal from a parent corporation to purchase all the outstanding
capital stock of a subsidiary corporation was not triggered when a
third party acquired all of the parent corporation's assets. The court
reasoned that the wholly owned subsidiary was a "separate legal en-
tity possessing its own separate assets and liabilities; ' 77 thus, the par-
ent had no authority to transfer the assets of the subsidiary.78 It is
unclear upon what operative facts the court based its decision, but
regardless, the case reaches an overly formalistic and ultimately unfair
result. The subsidiary was entirely controlled by the parent, yet the
73. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
74. FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CoRPoRATIoNs 110 (1931).
75. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG & KURT A. STRASSER, THE LAW OF CORPoRATE GROUPS:
STATUTORY LAW: SPECIFIC § 32.02 (1992) [hereinafter BLUMBERG & STRASSER, STATU-
TORY LAW: SPECIFIC].
76. 30 F.3d 627 (5th Cir. 1994).
77. Id. at 629.
78. Id.
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court made no attempt to take that domination into account. Instead
the court's inappropriate use of the independent-entity paradigm
compelled it to conclude that the parent corporation could not affect
the policies of the subsidiary. This conclusion is unrealistic and an
example of the problems resulting from the application of the tradi-
tional corporate paradigm to subsidiaries.
Unfortunately, few cases present a more sophisticated under-
standing of the parent-subsidiary relationship. Since parent-share-
holders are likely to be the only corporate constituency with standing
to challenge action by subsidiary directors, and since parent-share-
holders of wholly owned subsidiaries have other methods of keeping
subsidiary directors in line, the reported cases dealing with this rela-
tionship are scarce.
Nevertheless, some support exists for the idea that the law should
treat the directors of wholly owned subsidiaries differently. For exam-
ple, in the 1988 case of Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle East-
ern Corp.,79 the Supreme Court of Delaware unequivocally stated that
"in a parent and wholly owned subsidiary context, the directors of the
subsidiary are obligated only to manage the affairs of the subsidiary in
the best interests of the parent and its shareholders."80 The court's
underlying principle is correct-it is unrealistic to expect the directors
of wholly owned subsidiaries to do anything but serve the interests of
the parent. However, although the Anadarko decision reaches a cor-
rect result in terms of the parent-subsidiary dynamic, it fails to address
the deeper issues confronting subsidiary directors. Those issues result
79. 545 A.2d 1171 (Del. 1988).
80. Id. at 1174. The facts of Anadarko deserve some development. Anadarko Petro-
leum Corp. ("Anadarko") was a wholly owned subsidiary of Panhandle Eastern Corp.
("Panhandle"). Id. at 1173. Panhandle and some of its other subsidiaries were engaged in
the business of running natural gas pipelines. Id Anadarko was engaged in the business of
developing and extracting oil. Id. Panhandle's board of directors decided to divest itself of
Anadarko by spinning off the subsidiary to the existing shareholders of Panhandle. Id
After the spin-off, Anadarko shares would be listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Id.
In the information statement distributed to its shareholders regarding this spin-off transac-
tion, Panhandle indicated that it would continue to do business with Anadarko after the
spin-off. See id. at 1176. Toward that end, prior to the spin-off, Panhandle and Anadarko
renegotiated several intra-corporate contracts so that the renegotiated contracts were
much more favorable to Panhandle. Id at 1173-74. After the spin-off, Anadarko's new
board of directors sued Panhandle to void the renegotiated contracts. Id at 1174. The
Anadarko court did not impose a burden of showing "entire fairness" on Panhandle, be-
cause a fiduciary duty would arise only if Panhandle and the original Anadarko board had
held a fiduciary position with respect to the future stockholders of Anadarko and had
engaged in self-dealing to the detriment of those shareholders. Id at 1175. The court
found no such duty. Id. at 1174-75.
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from the conflicting duties that subsidiary directors owe to not just the
corporation and its shareholders, but other parties as well.
H. Beyond Anadarko-Considering the Subsidiary Directors'
Duties to Nonshareholders
The Anadarko case avoids the important and difficult question of
what happens to the other duties owed by the directors of the subsidi-
ary. In addition to the duties to shareholders recognized in the
Anadarko decision, directors of corporations generally owe duties to
the corporate entity8l and sometimes owe duties to creditors or other
constituencies. The Anadarko decision's emphasis on shareholder in-
terests does not adequately explain what happens to the duties owed
to nonshareholders in the subsidiary situation.
A. Duties of Directors to Nonshareholders
Application of Anadarko in the real world presents serious
problems because it fails to consider duties that may be owed to non-
shareholder constituents. These duties arise under both case and stat-
utory law, and are increasingly championed in academic literature.
(1) Duties to Creditors
For example, some case law holds that when a corporation is in
financial distress (insolvent, or in the vicinity of insolvency), the direc-
tors of the troubled corporation owe a duty to the corporation's credi-
tors.82 In the famous case of Pepper v. Litton,8 3 Justice Douglas stated
that a director's fiduciary duty is "designed for the protection of the
entire community of interests in the corporation-creditors as well as
stockholders."84 Read broadly, the Pepper case establishes the princi-
ple that, in the financial distress situation, directors may not maximize
shareholder benefit if that action will be inequitable to other constitu-
ents who have a connection to the corporation.
Other case law supports the Pepper principle. Several cases hold
that directors must manage an insolvent corporation's assets as if they
81. See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
82. For a comprehensive discussion of this duty, see Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reex-
amining the Fiduciary Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Direc-
tors' Duties to Creditors, 20 DEt.. J. CoRP. L. 1 (1995).
83. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
84. Id. at 307 (emphasis added).
were in trust for creditors.85 Although this duty to creditors is limited,
the courts have noted the difficulty of applying such a duty in the real
world.86 While some older Delaware cases applied the trust fund the-
ory with some enthusiasm,8 7 more recent cases are somewhat more
circumspect.88
Despite this hesitation, some cases have extended the directors'
duty to consider nonshareholder interests, specifically creditor inter-
ests, to situations in which the corporation is merely "in the vicinity"
of insolvency. In Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Communi-
cations Corp.,8 9 a Delaware Court of Chancery held:
[W]here a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a
board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers
i.e. shareholders], but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise ....
The board of directors] had an obligation to the community of in-
terest that sustained the corporation, to exercise judgment in an in-
formed, good faith effort to maximize the corporation's long-term
wealth creating capacity.90
85. See, e.g., In re STN Enters., 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that directors
of an insolvent corporation owe a fiduciary duty to creditors); New York Credit Men's
Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Weiss, 110 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1953) (holding that if the
corporation is insolvent or is approaching insolvency, the corporation's directors and of-
ficers are obligated to protect the property for the corporate creditor-beneficiaries).
86. For example, it appears that the duty to creditors does not exist in the normal
operation of the corporation. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc.,
716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524 n.33 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (refusing to impose fiduciary duty on the
corporation's director in cases that do not involve fraud or insolvency); Simons v. Cogan,
549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988) (holding that directors owe no fiduciary duty to convertible
debenture holders); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 222 (Del. Ch. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1988) (holding that directors owe fiduciary duty to debenture
holders only in "special circumstances" including insolvency, fraud or illegality). But see
Allied Indus. Int'l, Inc. v. AGFA-Gevaert, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1516, 1521 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(concluding that directors do owe a duty to creditors of the corporation). For a general
discussion, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible
Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 667; Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 1988 J.
CORP. L. 205; Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW.
413 (1986).
87. Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808 (Del. 1944) (applying trust fund doc-
trine in reversing a lower court ruling granting a motion to dismiss in the case of an espe-
cially egregious abuse of the corporate franchise that operated as a fraud on creditors);
Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. v. South Broad St. Theatre Co., 174 A. 112, 116 (Del. Ch. 1934)
(recognizing "trust fund" doctrine as a shorthand expression of the principle that directors
should of an insolvent corporation act honestly and fairly); Asmussen v. Quaker City
Corp., 156 A. 180, 181-82 (Del. Ch. 1931) (recognizing trust fund doctrine, but refusing to
apply it strictly).
88. See In re Rego Co., 623 A.2d 92, 95 (Del. Ch. 1992) (apparently limiting the Dela-
ware version of the trust fund theory to dissolution of the corporation).
89. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. 12150,
1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *107-*109 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
90. Id.
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In reaching this holding, the court relied on a view of the corporation
as a legal and economic entity whose interests do not necessarily coin-
cide with the interests of its shareholders.9 1
Although the Credit Lyonnais opinion generated criticism,92 its
basic premise was followed in Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co.93 In
Geyer, the chancery court again concluded that the directors owe a
fiduciary duty to creditors upon insolvency.94 The Geyer court ex-
plained that because the interests of the "corporate enterprise" had to
be served, the directors should not limit their concerns to the share-
holder interests only.9 5 Just how broad these other duties are remains
unclear. Unfortunately, it is an area of director duty left untouched
by the A.L.I. Principles of Corporate Governance. 96
(2) Duties to "Other Constituencies"
In addition to their duties to creditors, corporate directors may
owe duties to (or at least may be permitted to take into account the
interests of)97 other constituencies of the corporate enterprise.98 For
example, directors may be permitted to consider these other interests
as a way to maximize long-term corporate success, even at the sacri-
91. Id. at *108 n.55. Chancellor Allen was quite explicit about the dichotomy be-
tween corporate interests and shareholder interests: "that result [protecting creditors] will
not be reached by a director who thinks he owes duties directly to shareholders only. It
will be reached by directors capable of conceiving of the corporation as a legal and eco-
nomic entity."
92. Martin J. Bienenstock, Conflicts Between Management and the Debtor in Posses-
sion's Fiduciary Duties, 61 U. CiN. L. R.Ev. 543,555-56 (1992); C. Robert Morris, Directors'
Duties in Nearly Insolvent Corporations: A Comment on Credit Lyonnais, 19 J. Cons. L. 61
(Fall 1993); Gregory V. Varallo & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Fiduciary Obligations of the Direc-
tors of the Financially Troubled Company, 48 Bus. LAW. 239 (1992).
93. 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992).
94. Id. at 789-90.
95. As the court explained:
The existence of the fiduciary duties at the moment of insolvency may cause di-
rectors to choose a course of action that best serves the entire corporate enter-
prise rather than any single group interested in the corporation at a point in time
when shareholders' wishes should not be the directors only concern.
Id. at 789.
96. For a discussion of this issue, see Deborah A. DeMott, Down the Rabbit-Hole and
into the Nineties: Issues of Accountability in the Wake of Eighties-Style Transactions in Con-
tro; 61 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 1130, 1150-54 (1993).
97. Although the courts have not yet imposed a duty to other constituencies in situa-
tions other than creditor protection, case law indicates that the board of directors are not
obligated solely to the shareholder, but also to the stakeholder interests. Mitchell, supra
note 62, at 610-30.
98. "Other constituencies" may include employees, customers, suppliers, communities
in which the corporation operates, bondholders, and virutually any other group with a
connection to the corporation.
fice of short-term shareholder gain.99 These duties to other constitu-
encies may be created by case law or by statute.
(a) Case Law
In Delaware, the common law rule governing when corporate di-
rectors may account for the interests of "other constituencies" has
evolved over many years.10 In recent years, however, the Delaware
Supreme Court's views appear to have seesawed back and forth. On
closer examination, however, these apparent vacillations can be ex-
plained. In the 1985 Unocal'0' decision, the Delaware Supreme Court
stated that when a board makes a decision in the best interests of the
corporation, it may consider, among other things, the impact of the
corporate action on constituencies other than the shareholders. 10 2
Since in situations not involving sale of control the directors are sup-
posed to make their decisions in the best interests of the corpora-
tion,10 3 consideration of nonshareholder constituents is appropriate.
In contrast, the Revlon'0 4 line of decisions downplays the consid-
eration of nonshareholder interests. In the Revlon situation, non-
shareholder interests play a more attenuated role, because
shareholder interests take precedent over those of the corporation.
While not dismissing the concerns of nonshareholder constituents en-
tirely, the Revlon court curtailed the consideration of those interests
99. Matheson & Olson, supra note 28, at 1465; see also Mitchell, supra note 62, at 605-
10 (arguing that standard corporate rules restraining director self-interest create unin-
tended externalities, but noting that these externalities may be allocated under other con-
stituency statues among the parties benefitting from the self-interest rules).
100. The idea has arisen periodically in Delaware corporate jurisprudence since at least
the early 1960s. In Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136 (Del. Ch. 1960), the directors of a cosmet-
ics and household drug manufacturer decided to use corporate funds to buy out a large
shareholder who owned a chain of drugstores. Id. at 138-39. The directors were motivated
in part by fear that the shareholder's designs for gaining control of the manufacturer could
result in strained relations with the manufacturer's other customers, who were competitors
of the shareholder in the drugstore business. l at 139-40. In the suit brought by a minor-
ity shareholder, the court held that the directors' action was not a violation of directors'
fiduciary duty because it was motivated in part to protect existing customers from the
whims of this shareholder. Id. at 141-42. In Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964), the
directors decided to use corporate funds to redeem the shares of a shareholder who had a
"poor reputation." Id. at 556. The fact that the director action was motivated in part for
the purpose of avoiding employee unrest was not a violation of the directors' fiduciary
duty. Id.
101. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
102. Id. at 955-58.
103. See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
104. See Revlon, Inc. v. McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182-83
(Del. 1986).
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by saying that "[a]Ithough such considerations may be permissible,
there are fundamental limitations upon that prerogative. A board
may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsi-
bilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the
shareholders."10 5
In the language of the Revlon court, concern for nonshareholder
constituencies in the change-of-control context is "inappropriate" be-
cause the "object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate
enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder."'1 06 This language sup-
ports the idea that the concept of the "corporation" includes the inter-
ests of nonshareholders. This language implies a difference between
maintaining the "corporate enterprise" (in which context concern for
nonshareholders is appropriate) and maximizing shareholder value
(i.e., selling the shareholder interests to the highest bidder).
By focusing on shareholder benefits, Revlon seemed to dispel any
inkling of an independent duty running from the directors to non-
shareholder constituencies. However, the Revlon case dealt with what
constituted the best interests of the shareholders in the sale-of-control
context, not (as in Unocal) with director decisions about the best in-
terests of the corporation.10 7 Because Revlon requires a board to shift
its duties from the corporation as a whole to focus solely on short-
term shareholder wealth maximization, the court properly marginal-
ized nonshareholder interests.
Revlon, however, did not spell the end of director concern for
nonshareholder interests. In 1987, the Delaware Supreme Court reit-
erated the Unocal language in Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp.,108 a case in which Revlon duties were not triggered. In consid-
ering the best interests of the corporation, the target's board was al-
lowed to consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies. 0 9
In 1989 the court included language similar to that of Revlon in Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.," 0 a case involving Revlon du-
ties."' As would be expected in a Revlon situation, Mills Acquisition
105. Id. at 182.
106. Id.
107. See Revlon, 506 A.2d 173.
108. 535 A.2d 1334, 1341-42 (Del. 1987).
109. Id. at 1341-42 ("[T]he board may under appropriate circumstances consider...
the impact on constituencies other than shareholders ... .
110. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
111. The court stated that in the context of running an auction and deciding whether to
accept an offer, the board could consider "the impact of both the bid and the potential
acquisition on other constituencies, provided that it bears some reasonable relationship to
general shareholder interests." Id. at 1282 n29.
held that the board must put the interests of the shareholders above
the interests of the corporation." 2 Thus, consideration of the interests
of nonshareholder constituencies will be appropriate only if it bears a
"reasonable relationship" to the interests of the shareholders. 113
The two most recent important cases, Time 1 4 and QVC, 1 5 also
bear out the dichotomy between Revlon situations and non-Revlon
situations. In Time, a non-Revlon case, the court approved the
board's recognition of nonshareholder interests as an appropriate part
of the determination of what is best for the corporation.1" 6 Not sur-
prisingly, the opinion in QVC, which concerned a Revlon situation,
makes no mention of the "other constituencies" who might benefit
from director action. Of course, QVC cites Revlon with approval," 7
so one would surmise that the Revlon nonshareholder interest rule
still stands.
(b) Statutory Law
Although Delaware case law supports director consideration of
nonshareholder interests when determining what course of action is in
the corporation's best interest, a more important phenomenon in most
states has been the enactment of "other constituency" statutes. 118 A
large number of states have passed laws permitting directors to con-
sider nonshareholder interests when making corporate decisions. 19
112. Id. at 1280.
113. Id. at 1288. The "reasonable relationship" language of Mills and the "rationally
related benefit" language of Revlon appear to mean the same thing. See James J. Hanks,
Jr., Playing With Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes in the 1990s, 21 SaETSON L.
REv. 97, 101 n.25 (1991).
114. Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
115. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
116. 571 A.2d at 1153; see supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
117. 637 A.2d at 46-48.
118. At least twenty-eight states have enacted other constituency statutes. For a sum-
mary of these laws in tabular format, see Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation
of Corporate Constituency Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 S-ETSON L. REv.
163, 194-96 (1991).
119. Maine's corporate constituency statute is fairly typical of the permissive, but not
mandatory, nature of these provisions. It states that:
In discharging their duties, the directors and officers may, in considering the best
interests of the corporation and of its shareholders, consider the effects of any
action upon employees, suppliers and customers of the corporation, communities
in which offices or other establishments of the corporation are located and all
other pertinent factors.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West Supp. 1994). Connecticut's "other constitu-
ency" provision, on the other hand, appears to be unique in that it requires the board to
take into consideration the "long-term" interests of the corporation and its shareholders,
the interests of employees, customers, creditors, and suppliers and "community and socie-
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These statutes raise many questions, such as whether they give
nonshareholders standing to sue for failure to consider their interests;
how much weight, if any, can or must be given to nonshareholders'
interests; and what standards should guide directors in considering
these interests. 120 Although the statutes have been widely criticized
by legal commentators, 121 the widespread adoption of these statutes
may show that the states believe the corporation concept extends be-
yond shareholders to reach stakeholders as well.'22 If so, the real
function of the statutes is to help the directors achieve their primary
goal of discharging their duty to the corporation, with the understand-
ing that "corporation" is broadly defined to include all constituents
that contribute to the corporate enterprise. 123 This broad view of the
corporation has been advanced by "communitarian" corporate schol-
ars.124 In conscious opposition to the libertarian aspects of the con-
tractarian approach to corporations, a group of scholars have set out
to place corporations in a larger context through the development of
so-called "communitarian" theories of the corporation.125 Drawing
tal considerations" when making decisions in connection with the merger or the sale of
substantially all the assets of a publicly traded Connecticut corporation. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 33-313 (West Supp. 1995).
120. See, e.g., Charles Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for Perspective,
46 Bus. LAW. 1355, 1369-70 (1991) (discussing the impact of other constituency statutes).
121. See, e.g., William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L.
REv. 385 (1990); Hanks, supra note 113; Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the
Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fidu-
ciary Duties, 21 STErSON L. REv. 23 (1991) (arguing that the "gap-filling" function of the
fiduciary duty should apply only to the director-shareholder relationship because of the
difficulties of providing explicit contractual mechanisms to cover all aspects of that dy-
namic, while on the other hand, nonshareholder constituents do possess adequate contrac-
tual protections).
122. Matheson & Olson, supra note 27, at 1466. Other commentators have applauded
these laws as the best hope for aligning director action with the long-term interests of the
shareholders, the stakeholders, and the corporation. See, Mitchell, supra note 62, at 589-90
(arguing that the duty of the directors is broadly defined). Confusion between the exist-
ence of duty and the enforcement of duty arises in cases because the shareholders are the
only constituents with the power to enforce the directors' duty in most situations. Id. at
603; Wallman, supra note 118; David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REv.
223 (1991) (discussing the effect of other constituency statutes in a balanced, generally
positive tone).
123. See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
124. For a discussion of the contractarian approach as seen through the eyes of a com-
munitarian, see David Million, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corpo-
rate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1373, 1377-78 (1993) and infra notes 185-204 and
accompanying text.
125. For a general discussion of the contract versus community debate, see William T.
Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. Rnv. 1395
(1993); see also Millon, supra note 124, at 1391-93 (providing a bibliography of communi-
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
on the legal authority developed in the preceding section and incorpo-
rating theoretical justifications, the arguments of these scholars may
find their way into the mainstream of corporate law and eventually
influence judicial decisions.
The developments in the case law, statues, and academic litera-
ture seem to have affected the development of the A.L.I. Corporate
Governance Project. It provides support for certain director action
that does not enhance short-term shareholder wealth.' 26 Although
the Principles of Corporate Governance state that the objective of the
corporation is "the conduct of business activities with a view to en-
hancing corporate profit and shareholder gain,' 27 a comment adds:
The modem corporation by its nature creates interdependencies
with a variety of groups with whom the corporation has a legitimate
concern, such as employees, customers, suppliers, and members of
communities in which the corporation operates. The long-term
profitability of the corporation generally depends on meeting the
fair expectations of such groups. Short-term profits may properly
be subordinated to recognition that responsible maintenance of
these interdependencies is likely to contribute to long-term profit-
ability and shareholder gain.'28
The Principles also permit the corporation to use a "reasonable
amount" of its resources for "public welfare, humanitarian, educa-
tional, and philanthropic purposes,' 29 even when there is no en-
hanced profit to the corporation. 130 Nevertheless, the Principles do
not establish a duty on the directors to act on behalf of the non-
shareholder interests.' 31
As discussed above, it appears that corporate directors may owe
fiduciary duties to different constituencies depending on the context
in which they are acting. 132 Ordinarily, directors owe their primary
tarian scholarship in the corporate law field); David Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Re-
birth of Corporation Lawl 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 903 (1988) (heralding the emergence
of an approach to corporate law that seeks to address important questions about the rela-
tionship between corporations and society).
126. A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CoRPogR E GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, § 201(a).
127. Id.
128. Id. § 2.01 cmt. f.
129. Id. § 2.01(b)(3).
130. Id. § 2.01 cmt. i; see also Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 1276-77 (stating that corpo-
rations may use resources without showing a direct benefit to the corporation).
131. A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, § 2.01 cmt. h. For
a criticism that the A.L.I. PRINCIPLES fail to adequately address the significance of the
stakeholder empowerment movement of the 1980s, see Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of
the Stakeholder Model, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1156 (1993).
132. A fiduciary duty that presents such a moving target may be hard to accept, but it
appears that is where Delaware law at least presently resides. Herbert M. Wachtell, of
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fiduciary duty to the "corporation," which may include non-
shareholder interests. However, in change-of-control transactions, the
short-term profit interests of shareholders move to the fore; and in the
insolvency context, a duty to creditors may arise.133 None of these
duties are expressly limited to non-subsidiary corporations. There-
fore, these general duties of corporate directors may bind subsidiary
directors as well.
B. Placing Anadarko in the Nonshareholder Duty Context
If directors of subsidiaries, like those of other corporations, must
or may take into account the interests of nonshareholders, how does
that consideration fit with the Anadarko assertion that the subsidiary
directors owe a duty only to the parent corporation? Are the duties to
nonshareholders extinguished or are they imposed on the parent? 34
The Anadarko decision itself seems to rule out the idea that the par-
ent inherits the duties to the subsidiary "corporation," by stating that
"a parent does not owe a fiduciary duty to its wholly owned subsidi-
ary.' 35 That leaves a conundrum: if directors ordinarily owe a duty
to their corporation, but in the wholly owned subsidiary context they
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York, who successfully represented Time-Warner in
Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989), and who also
successfully represented QVC in Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,
637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993) on what seemed to be the opposite side of a similar matter, has
opined that corporate transactions will be examined on an individual basis. The tempta-
tion to distill the duties into formulas will backfire, he suggests, by saying "[p]eople like
formulas, people like certainty [but] life is not simple." New Territory or Familiar Soil?
Some See Revolution, Others See Evolution in Delaware's Paramount/QVC Case, BNA
Cons. Corms. WKLY., Apr. 20, 1994, at 6. In a similar vein, the first paragraph of Profes-
sor DeMott's examination of fiduciary duties includes the following statement: "Recogni-
tion that the law of fiduciary obligation is situation-specific should be the starting point for
any further anaylsis." Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879.
133. Some commentators have suggested that the Delaware decisions provide different
standards of review depending on whether the director decision in question deals with an
"enterprise" issue, such as whether the company should expand, or an "ownership" issue,
such as the negotiated price for a merger (roughly corresponding to the "change of con-
trol" situation discussed in text). "Ownership" issues receive higher scrutiny. See Michael
P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 Bus. LAW. 461,473-74 (1992); Bayless
Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips for Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41
Bus. LAw. 1, 6 (1985); E. Norman Veasey, The New Incarnation of the Business Judgment
Rule in Takeover Defenses, 11 DEL. J. CoR'. L. 503, 505 (1986).
134. For an essay fearing that Anadarko is symptomatic of a general decline in the
law's willingness to make actors do the right thing, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Parable of
the 1980s: Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Corp., 53 ALB. L. Rlv. 655
(1989).
135. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174
(Del. 1988).
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owe a duty only to the parent-shareholder, and the parent-share-
holder, in turn, does not owe a duty to the subsidiary corporation,
what becomes of the directors' fiduciary duty to the subsidiary corpo-
ration and to the third parties that are sometimes beneficiaries of di-
rectors' duties?
There are at least two possibilities to explain the fate of the sub-
sidiary directors' duty to the corporation and other constituencies.
The first possibility is that duties to nonshareholders do not exist in
the wholly owned subsidiary context. This conclusion must be wrong,
or else shareholders could cut off any fiduciary duty to third parties
merely by placing all their operating companies in the ownership of a
holding company.
The second possibility is that the board of directors of the holding
company bears a duty to the "corporation" it directs, and that corpo-
ration is defined to include the wholly owned subsidiaries. This ap-
proach seems workable, but case law supporting it is hard to find. In
this view, the duties of the subsidiary directors would be imposed on
the parent.
Although no cases involving these conflicts in the wholly owned
subsidiary context exist, cases involving subsidiaries with minority
shareholders shed some light on the matter. In these minority share-
holder subsidiary cases, the disputes usually turn on the question
whether the majority shareholder has taken a benefit from the subsid-
iary at the expense of the minority interest. 136 In dicta, the courts
have provided some guidance for subsidiary directors in resolving the
conflict of duties between the parent-shareholder and the subsidiary
as corporate entity.
Unfortunately, the guidance is often unhelpful. For example, in
Jones v. H.. Ahmanson,137 the California Supreme Court made the
enigmatic statement that "the fiduciary obligations of directors and
136. See infra notes 222-231 and accompanying text.
137. 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969). The case involved a savings and loan that was 85%
owned by a group of shareholders acting in concert and 15% owned by minority sharehold-
ers. Id. at 467. The market for S&L's in California at the time was very bullish and the
majority wanted to find a way to cash in on the popularity of S&L stocks by somehow
creating a market for their shares. Id. Instead of voting a stock split in the S&L's stock
and directly accessing the securities market with the S&L as the issuer, the majority instead
decided to form a holding company that would own their 85% interest. The holding com-
pany, in turn, would access the securities market and thereby create a market for the ma-
jority's ownership interest in the S&L. Of course, this strategy left the 15% minority
shareholders in the S&L without a market for their shares and no way to cash out except to
sell to the holding company at a discount. The minority sued the majority for breach of its
fiduciary duty.
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shareholders are neither limited to specific statutory duties and avoid-
ance of fraudulent practices nor are they owed solely to the corpora-
tion to the exclusion of other shareholders. '' 138 This intruiging
passage is anything but a model of clarity. While it is clear that the
court sees a duty to the shareholders, it is not clear what it means by
the term "corporation." Because the court notes a duty to "other
shareholders," perhaps "corporation" is being used as a shorthand
way to refer to only the "majority shareholders.' 139
On the other hand, the quotation comes after a discussion of
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini,140 which quoted Pepper v.
Litton 41 at great length. The Pepper case concerned the rights of
creditors to have priority in bankruptcy over the claims of insiders,
and clearly established the director's duty to the "entire community of
interests in the corporation"142-not just to the shareholders. While
Pepper acknowledged a duty to the corporation and viewed the con-
cept of the corporation quite broadly, it does not appear that the
Ahmanson court meant the term "corporation" to be used in that
sense. The Ahmanson court's statement that the controlling share-
holder's use of its power "must benefit all shareholders proportion-
ately and must not conflict with the proper conduct of the
corporation's business"'143 reinforces the notion that directors owe a
duty to the shareholders as a whole, but without establishing what
kind of duty, if any, is owed to the corporation as an entity.
Nevertheless, the admonition not to take action that will "conflict
with the proper conduct of the corporation's business," read in light of
the favorable citation to Pepper, may amount to a broadly-defined
duty to the "corporation." In fact, the opinion quotes Pepper for the
proposition that directors bear the burden "not only to prove the good
faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the
viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein."' 44 A later
138. Id. at 472 (citing Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini, 241 P.2d 66 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1952)).
139. The Ahmanson opinion does cite an old case that appears to use the term in that
manner: "When a number of stockholders combine to constitute themselves a majority in
order to control the corporation as they see fit, they become for all practical purposes the
corporation itself, and assume the trust relation occupied by the corporation towards its
stockholders." 460 P.2d at 473 (quoting Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 27 F. 625, 631
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886)).
140. 241 P.2d 66, 75 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
141. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
142. Id. at 307; see supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
143. 460 P.2d at 471.
144. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939)).
California case, Smith v. Tele-Communication, Inc.,145 reiterates this
language,146 but does not elaborate on what the cases mean by "cor-
poration." Perhaps significantly, the Smith case omits from the phrase
"and those interested therein" from the original quotation.147 The
opinion gives no indication whether the change is intentional, and if
so, whether it is important. In the end, it remains hard to tell who the
recipient of the subsidiary directors' duties should be.
C. Appreciating the Significance of the Subsidiary Director's Dilemma
The concern over subsidiary director liability to nonshareholders
is not a purely academic enterprise. For example, in many cases the
directors of subsidiary banks have found themselves subject to liability
to the FDIC. The chain of events leading to liability begins when a
bank fails and the FDIC is appointed as receiver. As receiver, the
FDIC must maximize the value of assets owned by the failed bank,
including any causes of action the bank may have. Therefore, the
FDIC may bring claims on behalf of the failed bank against the bank's
directors for failure to take action in the best interest of the bank.148
In addition, bank directors are personally liable under federal banking
laws.149
The subsidiary directors are held personally liable despite the fact
that banking law contains the seeds of enterprise liability.150 The
banking regulatory scheme employs enterprise principles when it
145. 184 Cal. Rptr. 571 (Ct. App. 1982).
146. Id. at 575.
147. Id.
148. Barnett, supra note 18, at 72-74 (describing actions), id. at 103-19 (providing ex-
amples of FDIC complaints). Making life even more difficult for bank directors is the
"adverse domination" doctrine, which can prevent the statute of limitations from tolling on
causes of action against the board of directors. See Michael E. Baughman, Comment, De-
fining the Boundaries of the Adverse Domination Doctrine: Is There Any Repose for Cor-
porate Directors?, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1065 (1995).
149. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994); Douglas V. Austin & Sidney M. Weinstein, Bank
Officer and Director Liability Under FIRREA: The Need for a National Standard of Gross
Negligence, 111 BANKING L.J. 67 (1994); Cindy A. Schipani, Should Bank Directors Fear
FIRREA: The FDIC's Enforcement of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and En-
forcement Act, 17 J. CORP. L. 739 (1992); Jon Shepherd, Note, The Liability of Officers and
Directors Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989,
90 MICH. L. REv. 1119 (1992).
150. BLUMBERG & STRASSER, STATUTORY LAW: SPECIFIC, supra note 75, at 992-94;
Sommer, supra note 5, at 229 (observing that "the banking industry utilizes legal devices
that apparently confer legal personality on the subsidiary without conferring limited liabil-
ity on the parent").
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seeks to impose liability on bank holding companies'5 1 at every oppor-
tunity.152 Nevertheless, regulators continue to cling to the idea that
bank holding companies and their subsidiaries are independent
corporations. 53
Banking law's use of the independent corporation model places
bank directors in an awkward position. The vast majority of banks are
owned by bank holding companies. 5 4 The subsidiary banks, in turn,
are governed by boards of directors. Although banking regulators use
corporate enterprise principles to reach the resources of bank holding
companies, they employ independent entity principles to hold direc-
tors of subsidiaries personally liable. Perhaps this seeming contradic-
tion is a means to recover from as many parties as possible in a given
situation. Alternatively, perhaps regulators sincerely believe that sub-
sidiary directors may act independently and therefore should be held
151. As defined by statute, a bank holding company is any company that has control
over a bank or over a company that is or becomes a bank holding company. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(a)(1) (1994). Typically bank holding companies are corporations. But see 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(b) (1994) (defining bank holding company to mean any "corporation, partnership,
business trust, association, or similar organization"). The bank holding company itself is
merely a regular corporation formed under state incorporation laws. Although bank hold-
ing companies do not require special charters, they are regulated by the Federal Reserve
Board under the Bank Holding Company Act. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994).
152. Methods employed by banking regulators to impose liability on bank holding
companies include, among other things, the so-called source of strength doctrine, 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.4(a) (1995), cross guarantee provisions, 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e) (1994), and capital resto-
ration plans, 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)(2)(C)(ii) (1994).
153. The attempt to suggest that banking is really designed to be an enterprise liability
situation rings hollow in light of the requirements that banks and securities affiliates have
separate boards, that banks in separate states have separate boards, and that affiliates
within a bank holding company adhere to other "firewalls" designed to keep the holding
company subsidiaries as "independent" as possible. See, e.g., Citicorp, New York, New
York, Order Approving the Acquisition of Savings and Loan Association, Fed. Res. Bull.
656, 659-60 (Oct. 1982) (conditioning regulatory approval of acquisition on, among other
things, operation of the new subsidiary as a "separate, independent, profit-oriented corpo-
rate entity").
154. In 1988, a total of 6,503 bank holding companies owned 9,322 domestic commer-
cial banks, representing 84.6% of the total number of domestic commercial banks and
90.2% of the bank deposits in the country. Steven B. Long, Note, AMBAC: The Substan-
tial Question Doctrine Under the Bank Holding Company Act, 79 GEo. L. J. 507, 507 n.1
(1991) (citing CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERvIsoRs, A PROFILE OF STATE-
CHARTERED BANKING 225 (1988)). The predominance of the bank holding company
structure can be attributed to various historical, economic and political forces. Bank hold-
ing companies can be seen as a marketplace response to the restrictive laws affecting the
banking industry. Although banks were restricted as to the kinds of businesses they could
engage in and where they could branch, bank holding companies did not face those restric-
tions, and provided an effective way to avoid the constraints of the banking laws. See
JONATHAN R. MACEY AND GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 293-
96 (1992).
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personally accountable for their acts. However, despite regulators'
hopes and desires, in the real world, directors of subsidiary banks fre-
quently lack the expertise and access to information necessary to
make sophisticated banking decisions or to critically analyze actions
proposed by the holding company.155 While the ideal of truly in-
dependent directors is a wonderful aspiration, in the real world direc-
tors' attempts at disinterested decision-making are often hobbled by
management. Holding such directors personally liable for decisions
they had little control over is unfair. A fairer result would be for regu-
lators to treat the whole bank holding company as one enterprise and
not focus on the directors of specific subsidiary banks.
The unfairness stems from the inappropriate application of the
independent entity model to the subsidiary corporation. The idea of
subsidiaries as independent legal persons is tied up in antiquated nine-
teenth-century ideas about corporate personality.156 Indeed, the idea
of parent and subsidiary as independent entities is central to the pri-
mary reason for forming subsidiaries-limitation of the parent's liabil-
ity. 157 In recent years a great deal has been written about the pros and
cons of limited liability in the corporate context; 158 however, very little
155. Hawke, supra note 19; Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Di-
rector's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1481-92 (1984). As the
American Bar Association's Committee on Corporate Laws has pointed out, unaffiliated
directors of controlled corporations frequently face "practical difficulties" in fulfilling the
review function, especially because of lack of access to relevant information. Committee
on Corporate Laws, American Bar Association, Guidelines for the Unaffiliated Director of
the Controlled Corporation, 44 Bus. LAW. 211, 212-13 (1988).
156. There have been several excellent treatments of corporate theory that examine
the evolution of the idea of the corporation from a concession granted by the sovereign to
an artificiam person to a natural person to an aggregate of contractual interests. For gen-
eral background on this topic, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN
LAW 1836-1937, at 12 (1991); JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS COR-
PORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 4 (1970); Phillip I. Blumberg,
The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283
(1990); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory,
88 W. VA. L. REV 173 (1985); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J.
201.
157. See CHESTER ROHLICH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTER-
PRISES § 10.02 (5th ed. 1975).
158. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 52; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraak-
man, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879
(1991) (suggesting an alternative regime to traditional limited liability); Janet Cooper Al-
exander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 HARv. L. REV.
387 (1992) (pointing out procedural obstacles to the Hansmann and Kraakman approach);
Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Per-
spective, 102 YALE L.J. 387 (1992) (pointing out various dynamics present in the capital
markets that would develop and likely frustrate the Hansmann and Kraakman approach);
Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80
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of the scholarship applies directly to the special case of subsidiary cor-
porations. 5 9 Professor Blumberg has concluded that many of the
traditional theoretical factors justifying limited liability for corpora-
tions generally become irrelevant in the context of subsidiary corpora-
tions. 160 Others have argued that the limited liability aspect of the
subsidiary is economically inefficient and therefore undesirable.' 61
Nevertheless, in modem practice, corporations form subsidiaries for
many reasons besides the desire to limit liability, such as to comply
with regulatory ownership requirements, or a desire to establish cer-
tain procedural benefits, such as venue and jurisdiction. 62 Regardless
of the reasons for the use of subsidiaries, they form a cohesive eco-
nomic unit with their parent and related corporations.
In the modem world, where one corporate enterprise might act
through hundreds of wholly owned subsidiaries across the country and
around the world, 63 the fiction of separate corporate personality for
each subsidiary in a corporate group does not reflect reality. Because
there is little practical difference in the real world between a wholly
(1991) (examining and rejecting the idea that limited liability is a privilege granted by the
state; finding instead that limited liability is the product of private ordering and thereby
compels the acceptance of the contract theory of the corporation); Richard A. Booth, Lim-
ited Liability and the Efficient Allocation of Resources, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 140 (1994) (view-
ing the primary purpose of limited liability to be the elimination of barriers between
corporations and their creditors).
159. Exceptions include Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 110-11, Posner, The
Rights of Creditors, supra note 5, at 509-16, and of course BLUMBERG, supra note 5. Pro-
fessor Blumberg has summarized the various advantages of limited liability as follows: per-
mitting absentee investors to avoid exposure to risk; permitting large-scale enterprise;
permitting diversification of portfolios; avoiding increased agency costs; avoiding impair-
ment of the efficiency of the capital market; avoiding increased collection costs for credi-
tors; avoiding the costs of contracting around liability; and the encouragement of risk-
taking. The disadvantages of limited liability generally are: unfairness and inefficiency for
tort and other involuntary creditors; unfairness and inefficiency for labor claimants; the
encouragement of excessive risk taking;, increased information and monitoring costs; im-
pairment of the efficiency of the market; and the possibility of misrepresentation.
BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 2, §§ 4.021-4.046; see also Easterbrook & Fis-
chel, supra note 5, at 40-62.
160. BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 2, § 5.01.
161. Sommer, supra note 5, at 231-42.
162. See ROHuCH, supra note 157 (citing various legal reasons for subsidiary formation
such as to limit liability, to avoid restrictions in the parent's charter or restrictions arising
under law, for tax reasons and for purposes of avoiding complications arising from "foreign
corporation" status; also citing nonlegal reasons such as increasing the morale of the sub-
sidiary's management, to settle shareholder disputes and public relations purposes);
LARRY A. SODEROUIST & A.A. SOMMER, JR., UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW 238-41
(1990) (citing use of subsidiaries in corporate acquisitions); Sommer, supra note 5, at 259-
73 (citing use as an effective method for controlling choice of law and venue).
163. Hadden, Inside Corporate Groups, 12 INT'L J. Soc. L. 271, 274 (1984).
owned subsidiary and a traditional corporate division, it seems unfair
that the legal treatment of one should differ from the other. 164 Not
only does the independent entity model of the corporation fail to re-
flect reality, it also presents an obstacle to clear thought on how cor-
porate groups should be treated under the law. 165 To deal effectively
with the legal issues of subsidiaries and complex corporate groups, the
law must break out of traditional paradigms of corporate personality
and embrace an idea of a corporate enterprise that cuts across particu-
lar legal entities.166
The United States Supreme Court may be moving in the direction
of adopting such corporate enterprise principles. The high court has
historically recognized corporations as "artificial beings."' 67  The
Court has ruled that, as legal persons, corporations are entitled to
many of the same constitutional rights as natural persons. 68 At the
same time, however, the Court has refused to recognize subsidiary
corporations as entities independent of their shareholder parent. In
164. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 303. For a traditional view of the rather inconsequen-
tial managerial aspects of the subsidiary-division distinction, see Robert W. Murphy, Cor-
porate Divisions vs. Subsidiaries, 34 HARV. Bus. REV. 83 (Nov.-Dec. 1956).
165. Legal thinking tends to become trapped in traditional paradigms. As Professor
Latty put it so eloquently almost sixty years ago: "The defects of the intransigent concep-
tualism which apparently accompanies the entity technique is of itself a source of danger in
legal thinking." ELVIN R. LATr-Y, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS 27
(1936).
166. Professor Adolph Berle advanced this idea almost fifty years ago: "In effect what
happens is that the court, for sufficient reason, has determined that though there are two or
more personalities, there is but one enterprise; and that this enterprise has been so handled
that it should respond, as a whole, for the debts of certain component elements of it."
Adolph Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 350 (1947). The
idea of enterprise liabilty has been developed extensively by Professor Blumberg in his
treatise, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS, and in various articles, see, e.g., supra note
156.
167. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
For an excellent discussion of the constitutional aspects of corporate personality, see
BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 2, at 299-318.
168. As Justice O'Connor conveniently summarized:
[A] corporation has a First Amendment right to freedom of speech, Virginia
Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976),
and cannot have its property taken" without just compensation, Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). A corporation is also
protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307 (1978), and can plead former jeopardy as a bar to a prosecution,
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977). Furthermore, a
corporation is entitled to due process, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), and equal protection, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985), of law.
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 284-85 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,169 the Supreme Court
struck down the "intra-enterprise conspiracy" doctrine of antitrust
law.170 The Court found that a parent corporation and its wholly
owned subsidiary "are incapable of conspiring with each other"'171 be-
cause, "a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary always have a 'unity
of purpose or a common design."' 72 Therefore, although the
Supreme Court recognized corporations generally as distinct legal
persons in Copperweld, it recognized that subsidiary corporations are
inextricably tied to the parent and cannot act independently.173
The Supreme Court's development of a model of corporate
groups as essentially single enterprises organized as separate legal en-
tities is a step toward accommodating the awkward position of the
subsidiary director, and helps bring the law into line with the realities
of the business world.174 Recognition that subsidiaries are but an-
other agency for the controlling shareholder would bring a great deal
of common sense and reason to this area of the law. The next step in
the development of the corporate enterprise model, recognizing that
subsidiary directors are merely agents of the parent corporation,
would not be a big step away from existing case law.175 In order to
deal with subsidiaries, the law must abandon the traditional view of
parent and subsidiary corporations as independent corporate entities
and acknowledge the overwhelming role that the shareholder-parent
plays in the life of the subsidiary.
169. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
170. The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine was a type of Sherman Act violation in
which a parent corporation conspired with entities it controlled to restrain trade. Id. at
759.
171. Id. at 777.
172. Id. at 771.
173. lId at 771-72. The holding of Copperweld appears to extend an earlier Supreme
Court case, NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398 (1960), in which the Court ap-
proved of the NLRB's view of affiliated corporations as a "single enterprise," where a
parent so controlled its subsidiaries as to give rise to a principal-agent relationship. Id. at
402-04. It is also in accord with cases treating parent and subsidiary corporations as one
party in interest for procedural purposes in litigation on the theory that, although con-
ducted under separate legal entities, the corporations are all part of the same "integrated
enterprise." See, eg., California Zinc Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 591, 593 (Ct. C1.
1947); United States ex reL TVA v. Powelson, 118 F.2d 79,89 (4th Cir. 1941), rev'd on other
grounds, 319 U.S. 266 (1943).
174. BLUMBERG & STRASSER, supra note 75, § 32.02.
175. See infra notes 217-26 and accompanying text.
I1. Resolving the Dilemma
The duties of the directors of wholly owned subsidiaries have not
been articulated clearly in the law. In part, this lack of clarity can be
attributed to a lack of legal precedent, which, in turn, can be attrib-
uted to the fact that a parent corporation is unlikely to sue the board
of its wholly owned subsidiary. Such litigation is only a remote possi-
bility, since most subsidiary boards lack the independence necessary
to pursue a course of action to which the parent might object. Even if
a board were to possess such independence, it would also have to pos-
sess a lack of concern for personal liability. The thrill of exploring the
outer limits of its fiduciary duties to the subsidiary would have to be
balanced against the possibility of personal liability to the parent for
breach of fiduciary duty.
Nevertheless, the lack of law on this subject does not mean that
directors of wholly owned subsidiaries need no guidance. On the con-
trary, the lack of guiding precedent or statute makes the need for aca-
demic commentary all the more pressing. Academic commentary
suggesting various possible schemes for resolving the subsidiary direc-
tor's dilemma may provide needed guidance for directors and courts
considering these matters. An ideal scheme would embody the princi-
ple of fairness, in that it would (1) treat similarly-situated actors in a
similar manner; (2) afford actors a legitimate opportunity to comply
with the law; (3) be simple, clear, and not subject to complicated spe-
cial cases; (4) be efficient, in the sense that it would be neither redun-
dant nor complicated to comply with; and (5) be predictable, so that
those covered by the rule would be able to plan effective
compliance. 176
Four approaches present themselves as possible solutions to the
awkward problem of subsidiary directors' fiduciary duties: the tradi-
tional ad hoc approach, a contractarian approach, a modification of
the "horizontal conflict" approach, and an approach I propose based
on agency law.
(1) Ad Hoc Approach
Proponents of the "ad hoc" approach to fiduciary duties believe
that spelling out a specific rule for the fiduciary relationship that will
176. Gregg A. Esenwein, An Overview of the Issues Concerning a Flat-Rate Income
Tax, 15 TAX NoTEs 947, 948-49 (1982).
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cover every situation is a hopeless task.177 Traditionally, the fiduciary
duty acts as a protection for beneficiaries who are dependent on the
actions and discretion of fiduciaries. 178 Although certain types of rela-
tionships are classically identified as "fiduciary" relationships, 79 the
fiduciary's precise obligation depends on the context of the relation-
ship. 80 The ad hoc approach to determining what duties the directors
of a subsidiary owe to whom is probably the state of the law today:
The facts and circumstances of the transaction in question determine
the nature and extent of the duty owed.'8 ' The ad hoc approach
seems to be the method employed to determine what kind of duty the
majority shareholder owes to minority shareholders in a subsidiary. 182
In this situation-specific approach to the fiduciary duty, subsidiary di-
rectors may owe a duty to the parent shareholder only, or in other
situations they may owe a duty to other constituents.183
The case-by-case ad hoc approach is the central thesis of Profes-
sor Blumberg's treatise on parent and subsidiary corporations, The
Law of Corporate Groups. 84 Believing that wholesale implementa-
tion of an enterprise principle for all corporate groups would not be
realistic, Professor Blumberg recognizes that, in the absence of deter-
177. DeMott, supra note 132, at 879 ("Recognition that the law of fiduciary obligation
is situation-specific should be the starting point for any further analysis.").
178. William W. Bratton, Self-Regulation, Normative Choice; and the Structure of Cor-
porate Fiduciary Law, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1084, 1100-01 (1993); DeMott, supra note
132, at 915.
179. Such relationships include attorney-client, agent-principal, guardian-ward and
trustee-beneficiary. See DeMott, supra note 132, at 908; United States v. Chestman, 947
F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
180. DeMott, supra note 132, at 908.
181. See e.g., Smith v. Tele-Communication, Inc., 184 Cal. Rptr. 571, 574 (Ct. App.
1982) (when "overreaching" by parent is present, majority shareholder held to higher stan-
dard of fairness); Palley v. McDonnell Co., 295 A.2d 762,765 (Del. Ch. 1972) (transactions
accomplished without the participation of the subsidiary's minority stockholders places
controlling shareholder within the strictures of the rule of intrinsic fairness), affd, 310 A.2d
635 (Del. 1973); Warren v. Century Bankcorp., 741 P.2d 846, 848-49 (Okla. 1987) (when
parent exercises control so as to receive benefits not shared with the subsidiary's minority
shareholders, the intrinsic fairness test applies).
182. See Gabelli & Co. Profit Sharing Plan v. Liggett Group, Inc., 444 A.2d 261, 264-65
(Del. Ch. 1982) ("The mere existence of this [majority-minority shareholder] relationship,
however, does not by itself invoke the intrinsic fairness test. The fiduciary relationship
must be accompanied by a showing of self-dealing or some other disabling factor before
the stricter test is warranted."), aff'd, 479 A.2d 276 (Del. 1984); see also 3 WILLIAM M.
FLETCHER, FLECrCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 852 n.3
(perm. ed. rev. vol. 1986) (stating that the nature and extent of the fiduciary duty of the
majority shareholders of a parent corporation to the minority shareholders of a subsidiary
corporation depends on the facts and circumstances of each case).
183. Cf. DeMott, supra note 132, at 915.
184. BLUMBERG & STRASSER, supra note 75, § 31.03.
minative legislation, judicial application of enterprise principles neces-
sarily involves a multidimensional analysis on a case-by-case basis.185
The ad hoc approach presents some real problems for corporate
directors. First, similarly situated persons might be treated differently.
Such a result is an inescapable byproduct of the factual determina-
tions inherent in the ad hoc approach. Consequently, some directors
will have a duty imposed, while others in very similar situations will
not. Secondly, the approach is not simple. Requiring an ad hoc deter-
mination in every case could get complicated, as parties expend re-
sources to distinguish or to analogize to previous situations. Third,
the ad hoc approach is not efficient; it requires expenditure of re-
sources in every instance to determine what duties are owed. Finally,
the ad hoc approach presents an obstacle for planning because it is not
predictable. As anyone engaged in planning knows, the legally signifi-
cant events that turn on "facts and circumstances" determinations are
cause for lost sleep. Although the occasional precedent that is on all
fours with the case before the court presents itself, such situations are
few and far between. More likely the planner just crosses her fingers
and hopes the determination comes out right. For these reasons, the
ad hoc approach does not work well in the parent-subsidiary context.
(2) Contractarian Approach
A great deal has been written about the "contractarian" model of
corporate law, in which corporate statutes are seen as a kind of form
contract that contracting parties can vary by agreement. 86 Under this
view, corporate law should serve as a "default" term only-that is, it
should apply only when the contracting parties have not agreed other-
185. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity, supra note 156, at 371. Among other factors, the
extent that the parent exerts control over the subsidiary would be very important in decid-
ing whether to allow recovery against the parent.
186. The literature on this topic is overwhelming and beyond the scope of this article.
See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURF OF CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (1991); Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the
Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 99 (1989); Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual
Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1983); Robert Hessen, A New Concept of Corpora-
tions: A Contractual and Private Property Model, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1327 (1979); Sympo-
sium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989). For
critique of the contractual theory, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory
of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1989) [hereinafter
Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm]; William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of
Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 407 (1989) [hereinafter
Bratton, The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation]; Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Con-
tractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 697 (1990).
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wise.187 When the law does provide a default term, contractarian the-
ory holds that the law should supply the term that the parties would
have agreed to had they bargained about the matter, or alternatively
the law should employ the operational assumption of successful
firms. 18 In the contractarian's world of freely bargaining parties, the
market will lead to an economically efficient allocation of
resources.189
Under the contractual theory, the fiduciary duties traditionally
borne by agents are treated like any other contractual term. 90 They
can be bargained over and "opted out" of by the contracting par-
ties.'9 ' In this view, directors are mere agents of the shareholders and
the law should provide rules that will minimize shareholder agency
costs.
The QVC decision apparently rests on this theoretical founda-
tion. The opinion appears to operate on the conception that a corpo-
ration is not so much a legal person in its own right as it is a collection
of shareholders. For example, the QVC court stated that a valuable
asset, the "control premium," belonged not to "a single person, entity,
or group, but ... [to a] fluid aggregation of unaffiliated stockhold-
ers.'"1g This perspective is consistent with the contractarian theory of
corporations, in which the corporation is seen not as a legal "person,"
but rather as the intersection of a vast interconnecting web of con-
187. EASrERBROOK & FlsCHEL, supra note 186, at 36.
188. Id. at 36, 245.
189. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLuM. L. R-v. 1416,1418-19 (1989) (the dynamics of the market work in such a way as to
make managers act as if they had investors' interests at heart, "almost as if there were an
invisible hand"). But see Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law and Networks of
Contracts, 81 VA. L. REv. 757, 759-61 (1995) (questioning the contractarian paradigm on
the ground that each individual contract in the nexus effects the value of other contracts
and undermines the atomistic universe assumed by the contractarians); Lewis A. Korn-
hauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook
and Fische4 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1449, 1453-57 (1989) (discussing the shortcoming of the
contract metaphor and noting that transaction costs and imperfect information prevent the
formation of "ideal" contracts).
190. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1987) (describing a fidu-
ciary duty as "a standby or off-the-rack guess about what parties would agree to if they
dickered about the subject explicitly"), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988).
191. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REv. 1, 29-30 (1990); Frank H. Easter-
brook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 426-27
(1993); Jason Scott Johnston, Opting In and Opting Out: Bargaining For Fiduciary Duties
in Cooperative Ventures, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 291, 312 (1992).
192. Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del.
1993) (emphasis added).
tracts between various constituencies. The court's rationale for im-
posing a higher duty on directors in the change-in-control context was
that the shareholders were not able otherwise to fulfill their role as
overseers of the management in that situation.193
Some commentators see the contractarian approach to fiduciary
duty as wrong-headed. As Professor DeMott has pointed out, our
concept of fiduciary duty serves a more complex role than a mere con-
tractual gap-filler. 194 As she notes, in many situations, fiduciary duties
arise even in the absence of express contractual agreements or even
when express contractual agreements have been breached. 195 Tradi-
tionally, unlike antitrust law, fiduciary law is a means for regulating
relationships when one party is dependent on another party to take
discretionary action in the best interests of the first party. Unlike the
world of contract, traditional fiduciary law does not assume that all
actors should be free to pursue their self-interest; fiduciary law seeks
to prevent exactly that result.196
Others have argued that although the idea of corporate law as a
form contract is a useful metaphor, corporate law itself is not infinitely
manipulable, but in fact has some mandatory terms.' 97 The fiduciary
duty of directors may be one of those mandatory terms.198 The con-
tractarians have countered that these mandatory terms are "trivial"
because they fall into one of four categories: (1) they would have
been universally adopted anyway; (2) they can be avoided by strategic
planning; (3) they are changeable through the political process; or (4)
they are unimportant. 199
193. Id. at 43. This aspect is consistent with a "nexus of contracts" view of the world, in
which shareholders act as risk bearers and also assume the responsibility to police manage-
ment and bear agency costs. The creation of fiduciary duties is one way to force directors
to conform their conduct to the benefit of the shareholders. See EASTERBROOK & Fis-
CHEL, supra note 186, at 90-93.
194. DeMott, supra note 132, at 885-88.
195. Id.
196. Bratton, supra note 178, at 1101.
197. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1396-99 (1989); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403 (1985).
198. The A.L.I. Principles of Corporate Governance consider the fiduciary responsibil-
ities of directors to be mandatory and does not permit individual directors and their corpo-
rations to negotiate lower standards. A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
supra note 7.
199. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis,
84 Nw. U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990).
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Finally, others have argued that while the "contract" approach
must be understood primarily as a metaphor,200 a review of contract
law provides legitimate grounds for criticism of the contractarian per-
spective. Most importantly, contractarians place a great deal of faith
in the ability of freely contracting parties to reach economically effi-
cient positions. Yet the complete freedom of contract embraced by
contractarians is largely lacking in conventional contract law. As a
substantive matter, contract law is not a matter of "anything goes,"
but has many regulatory aspects meant to prevent unfair results, espe-
cially when there are disparities in bargaining power.201
As an approach to the subsidiary director problem, the con-
tractarian model falls short of the ideals of fairness, simplicity, effi-
ciency, and predictability. First, a rule that courts should impose the
term that the parties would have negotiated if they had thought about
the matter may result in similarly situated persons being treated dif-
ferently. Different parties will have different subjective preferences,
and the degree of duty will vary from one subsidiary to the next.
Since the contractarian approach only includes shareholders and man-
agers as the contracting parties, it ignores other parties to which duties
may be owed.2°2 Courts that take a broader view of what groups
should be included in the nexus of contracts will reach results inconsis-
tent with courts adhering to the shareholder-only model. If a court
instead employs the version of the contractarian model that calls for
using the term that successful firms have employed, inconsistent re-
sults will also occur as courts reach different conclusions about what
terms "successful" firms employ. It is likely that, in parent-subsidiary
relationships, that term used is one that favors the shareholder and
disregards all other constituents.
Secondly, the contract approach is not simple. Inquiring into
what contracting parties would have done is always speculative, and
could get exceptionally complicated in corporations with several
classes of securities and other legitimate contracting parties. Even if
200. Bratton, The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation, supra note 186, at 410; Braucher,
supra note 186, at 698.
201. Braucher, supra note 186, at 712-38 (discussing how contract law protects certain
parties and otherwise pursues a regulatory role, wholly removed from considerations of
economic efficiency, through the validity of consent, the interpretation of contracts and the
supplying of missing terms).
202. Macey, supra note 70, at 173.
the "successful firm" approach is used, the court must still expend
considerable effort to investigate what those firms do.20 3
Third, the contractarian approach is not efficient because it re-
quires expenditure of resources in every instance to determine what
the parties would have agreed to or what successful firms in fact do.
Although the hypothetical bargain mechanism may lower the transac-
tion costs of resolving a dispute,204 those transaction costs will still be
present and could be large.
Finally, the contractarian approach presents an obstacle for plan-
ning because it is not predictable. Who knows what the parties would
have agreed to? Often parties avoid issues in contract negotiations
precisely because they cannot agree on specific terms and hope the
issue will either not come up or will be resolved in their favor by a
court. Perhaps the contractarian approach is actually a benefit for
planners, since it places an added incentive on them to spell out all
terms. But spelling out all terms, as the contractarians admit, is an
almost impossible task,205 and that complexity is their primary reason
for having fiduciary duties.
(3) "Horizontal Conflict" Approach
The quandary of subsidiary directors is a perfect example of what
Prof. Lawrence Mitchell calls a "horizontal conflict"-a conflict in
which the board has conflicting duties to different corporate constitu-
encies.20 6 Horizontal conflicts are common in corporate law but are
poorly understood and little analyzed. For example, directors owe
203. The power given to the court to determine what the parties would have done is a
formidable power, even though it is a task courts undertake all the time. See Lyman John-
son, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68
TEx. L. REv. 865, 893 (1990) (noting that the courts' power to supply the missing terms is
"an awesome power indeed"). But see Larry E. Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and the Cor-
porate Contract, 78 GEo. L.J. 71, 108 n.193 (1989) (defending the hypothetical bargain
approach because it minimizes transaction costs).
204. Ribstein, supra note 203, at 108 n.193.
205. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 191, at 426.
206. Mitchell, supra note 62, at 591. As Professor Mitchell explains:
These conflicts between virtually omnipotent managers and relatively powerless
constituents of the corporation (or the corporation itself) can be described as
"vertical conflicts of interest," since they exist between a powerful group and rel-
atively powerless groups within the hierarchical corporate structure .... The ex-
ception to this unitary approach is the recent focus on conflicts among
constituents, which has been sharpened by the dislocations caused by the take-
over phenomenon. I term these conflicts, which exist among two or more rela-
tively powerless groups that have interests in the corporation, "horizontal
conflicts."
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shareholders a fiduciary duty, but what happens when there is more
than one class of stock? Sometimes the directors must make decisions
that benefit one class more than another class, but the law has not
dealt with these situations very satisfactorily.20 7 The incidence of hori-
zontal conflicts multiplies when one recognizes the many duties that
directors owe to constituents other than the shareholders. 208
Professor Mitchell has suggested that subsidiary directors should
be held to a standard similar that which directors of closely held cor-
porations must meet under Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.209
In that case, a shareholder-employee of a closely-held corporation was
fired from his job with the corporation after a falling-out with his fel-
low shareholders. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court applied
the fiduciary duty between close corporation shareholders that it first
expounded in Donahue v. Rudd Electrotype.210 In holding for the in-
jured shareholder, the Massachusetts court developed a test that ac-
tions harming a minority shareholder must be undertaken for a
legitimate business purpose and may be challenged further by the in-
jured shareholder if he can show that the corporate objective could
have been achieved by a less injurious method.21'
Although the directors would continue to act in the best interest
of the shareholders, they would also be required to consider the effect
of their action on a range of statutorily defined constituents.212 If they
could prove injury, the constituents under Mitchell's scheme would
have standing to sue the board. The board, in turn, would have the
burden of showing that its action was taken in pursuit of a legitimate
corporate purpose rather than for the benefit of the board itself 21 3 If
the board could demonstrate the legitimate purpose, then the plain-
tiffs would be allowed to prove that the board's goal could have been
accomplished by less injurious means. 214
In an ideal world, this scheme might be the best way to proceed.
Unfortunately, no cases or statutes have given standing to non-
shareholder constituents to challenge board action.215 But even if
courts suddenly and uniformly embraced the Mitchell approach and
207. Id at 638-39.
208. See supra notes 38-54, 82-115, and accompanying text.
209. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
210. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
211. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663.
212. Mitchell, supra note 62, at 635.
213. Id. at 636.
214. Id.
215. Mitchell himself concedes this point. Id. at 631.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
found standing, the Mitchell approach would still not work in the sub-
sidiary context. First, it would be unfair to subsidiary directors. The
directors are subject to the control of the shareholder.216 Attenuated
constituent interests that may or may not be sufficiently demonstrated
at trial pale by comparison to the omnipresent and dominant interest
of the shareholder. The subsidiary directors are not free agents, but
must do the bidding of the parent; it is unfair to expect them to meet
larger obligations to nonshareholder constituents. Second, the ap-
proach is not as simple as it could be. The burden of proof bounces
back and forth between parties; determining constituency harm and
potentially less harmful alternatives are flexible standards that will not
make sense from one case to the next. Third, the approach is ineffi-
cient because it wastes resources second-guessing the board. Finally,
it is unlikely to be predictable because the board's actions will always
be subject to review for a less harmful alternative.
(4) Agency Approach
In light of the dominant role played by the shareholder in the
operation of the subsidiary, it seems disingenuous to pretend that di-
rectors act independently of the wishes of the parent.217 The directors
rarely will be able to carry out their duties in the horizontal conflict
situation, nor will they be able to discharge their duty to some other
constituency if the ad hoc approach finds a duty. The board is be-
holden to the dominant shareholder constituency and will act in ac-
cordance with the shareholder's wishes. Further inquiry in most cases
would be a waste of time.
Given this reality, the law should treat subsidiary directors in ac-
cordance with their true status as agents of the parent and impose on
them only the duty to act in the parent's best interests.218 In turn, the
duties that directors of subsidiary corporations would have had if they
were truly independent should be imposed directly on the parent cor-
poration. In this way agency principles could supplement traditional
216. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 299-300.
217. The ABA Committee on Corporate Laws has tried to finesse the problem of con-
trolled directors by stating that the duties of affiliated and unaffiliated directors are the
same. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 155, at 213. Nevertheless, the Commit-
tee recognizes that, "[w]hile both affiliated and unaffiliated directors have the same fiduci-
ary duty to the controlled corporation, the affiliated directors cannot be expected to be
wholly detached from the special objectives of the controlling shareholder." Id. at 212.
218. This is the position taken by the Delaware Supreme Court in Anadarko Petro-
leum Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Corp., 545 A.2d 1171 (Del. 1988), and adopted as black-
letter law in 3 FLETCHER. supra note 182, § 852 n.4.50 (Supp. 1994), citing only Anadarko
for support.
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entity law. We could continue to recognize the legal separateness of
subsidiaries but also supplement that idea with the understanding
that, as part of a corporate group, the duties of the directors should be
passed on to the parent corporation.219 As has been recognized in
many cases in which the subsidiary has minority shareholders, the ma-
jority shareholder should be impressed with the duty of the direc-
tors.2 20 In the case of wholly owned corporations, that duty should be
the duty to make decisions in the best interest of the corporation, not
merely in the interests of the shareholders.
Of course, the agency idea is an ancient one.221 But recent cases
have applied it in the context of transactions involving "fair dealing"
with minority shareholders.2m This approach would amount to an en-
largement of the cases dealing with the duties of controlling share-
holders, such as Sinclair v. Levien,22 Weinberger v. UOP,224 Burton v.
Exxon,225 and Chiles v. Robertson.226 In Chiles,227 for instance, the
219. Professor Blumberg has considered this idea in the context of liability for subsidi-
aries, although I focus here on the liabilities of the subsidiary directors as agents of the
parent. See BLUMBERG, SuBSTANTIVE LAW, supra note 2, at 365-70.
220. See John C. Carter, The Fiduciary Rights of Shareholders, 29 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 823, 841-42 (1988).
221. Justice Cardozo made reference to the agency idea in the tort context seventy
years ago. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) ("Dominion may be so
complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general rules of agency the parent will be a
principal and the subsidiary an agent. Where control is less than this, we are remitted to
the tests of honesty and justice.") Justice Traynor of California cited an 1886 case that
essentially impressed the majority shareholders with the fiduciary duties of the directors.
See Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 473 (Cal. 1969) (citing Ervin v. Oregon
Ry. & Nay. Co., 27 F. 625, 631 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886)).
222. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464,471 (Cal. 1969) ("Majority
shareholders may not use their power to control corporate activities to benefit themselves
alone or in a manner detrimental to the minority."); infra notes 217-26 and accompanying
text.
223. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
224. 457 A.2d 701,703 (Del. 1983) (the majority shareholder bore the burden of prov-
ing by a preponderance of the evidence that the cash-out merger was fair); accord Citron v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 500 (Del. Ch. 1990).
225. -583 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The court recognized that parent corporations
owe the minority shareholders of their subsidiary corporations a fiduciary duty. Id. at 414.
The directors of the subsidiary placed there by the parent may be subject to the "intrinsic
fairness" test to review self-dealing transactions in which the parent gets a benefit to the
exclusion of the minority shareholder. 1d. at 416.
226. 767 P.2d 903 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
227. The facts of Chiles are exceptionally complicated, so I have taken some liberties
with them here to present the essence of the situation. The plaintiff was a minority share-
holder in several real estate corporations that had been set up to own shopping center
properties and to lease those properties to stores of the Fred Meyer chain. The lease pay-
ments from Fred Meyer, Inc. to the real estate corporations were set so as to cover the
mortgage payments on those properties. Because the leases were for a set amount and ran
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court found that the directors of a group of subsidiaries who were
dealing with their parent over issues involving a lease should have rec-
ognized their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder of the subsidi-
aries and negotiated the best possible deal for the subsidiaries. The
court properly imposed the duty of the subsidiary's directors directly
on the controlling shareholder.228
In Sinclair, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that "[a]
parent does indeed owe a fiduciary duty to its subsidiary when there
are parent-subsidiary dealings." 229 Although the case arose in the
context of a parent's self-dealing transactions, nothing in the opinion
requires that the parent's fiduciary duty be limited to those situations.
In fact, the case explicitly recognizes that when a shareholder domi-
nates a corporation and the selection of the corporation's board of
directors, the dominating shareholder should be charged with the du-
ties ordinarily imposed on the directors. 230 In that vein, Sinclair eval-
uated the parent's liability for certain parent-subsidiary transactions in
light of the business judgment rule or the intrinsic fairness test-the
same standards that would have applied to independent directors in
the same position. The case seems logical and compelling; in the con-
for a long term, eventually the lease payments fell far below the market rental for similar
commercial real estate. Of course, the low rent was a great economic benefit to Fred
Meyer, Inc.
The controlling shareholder of Fred Meyer, Inc. was also the controlling shareholder
in the real estate corporations. Eventually Fred Meyer, Inc. obtained ownership of the
shares in the real estate corporations that had been owned by the controlling shareholder,
so the real estate corporations became subsidiaries of Fred Meyer Inc. As a result of Fred
Meyer, Inc.'s acquisition of those shares, it essentially became its own landlord, controlling
the real estate corporations to which it paid rent.
In the early 1980s, the leveraged buy-out firm of Kohlberg Kravis and Roberts made a
proposal to take Fred Meyer, Inc. private. In order to make the deal work, however, KKR
needed to find a way to capture the value of the below-market-rate leases. Through clever
structuring, KKR decided to spin off Fred Meyer, Inc.'s interest as lessee in the sweetheart
leases to a limited partnership that would then sublease the stores to the "new" Fred
Meyer, Inc., which would be owned by the buy-out group. By creating the limited partner-
ship and the sublease, the new limited partners would obtain tax benefits which would
improve the return on the buy-out. In order to substitute the "new" Fred Meyer, Inc. as
tenant under the leases, the real estate corporations had to give their consent. When the
real estate corporations controlled by Fred Meyer, Inc. rolled over and played dead instead
of extracting some financial concessions in return for the consent, Chiles sued for breach of
fiduciary duties to him as a minority shareholder of the subsidiary. Id. at 905-11.
228. 767 P.2d at 916.
229. 280 A.2d at 720; accord Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 888 (Del.
1970). But see In re New York Rys., 82 F.2d 739, 741 (2d Cir. 1936) (where controlling
shareholder did not also control the board of directors, "there is no basis for the contention
that the [controlling shareholder] was in any fiduciary relationship"), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
687 (1936).
230. Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 719.
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text of wholly owned subsidiaries, it establishes the rationale for im-
posing all the duties of the subsidiaries' directors on the parent,
whether those duties run to minority shareholders, creditors, stake-
holders or regulators.
Similarly, in Wright v. Heizer Corp.,231 a majority shareholder
who controlled the board of directors caused the board to enter into a
pledge of the controlled corporation's assets to the controlling share-
holder on terms that were unfair to the controlled corporation. In a
derivative action by a minority shareholder, the controlling share-
holder was found liable.232 Cases of this type, in which the controlling
corporation overreaches, generally end with the parent corporation
owing a duty to the minority shareholders of the subsidiary. A logical
extension of that doctrine, however, would require that the parent
take on the duties that the subsidiary directors would have owed to
any other constituencies as well.233
A recent case gets it right. In Pioneer Annuity Life Insurance Co.
v. National Equity Life Insurance Co.,234 an Arizona Court of Appeals
judge adopted the position that the parent corporation owed its sub-
sidiary and "its cognizable communities of interest a fiduciary duty to
act fairly."235 The case involved an insurance holding company which
allegedly had systematically looted its subsidiary insurance company.
When both parent and subsidiary landed in receivership after the par-
ent's misapplication of reinsurance premiums, the subsidiary's re-
ceiver sued to impress a constructive trust on the reinsurance
premiums paid by the subsidiary to the parent. In overturning a grant
of summary judgment in favor of the parent, the Court of Appeals
recognized that the fiduciary duty borne by the parent was owed to
"policyholders and contractholders" of the subsidiary.23 6
An agency rule that presumptively holds the parent liable for all
duties that the subsidiary directors should have discharged fulfills the
practical goals of fairness, simplicity, efficiency, and predictability. On
fairness grounds, the subsidiary directors are not caught in the Catch-
22 that currently plagues them. Similarly situated directors will be
treated the same-they will owe a duty to the parent, and the parent
will pick up any other duties that should have been discharged.
231. 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. .1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
232. Id. at 251.
233. See supra notes 82-133 and accompanying text.
234. 765 P.2d 550 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
235. Id. at 555.
236. Id.
Presumptively imposing shareholder liability on parent corpora-
tions may seem unfair to the parent and antithetical to the idea that
the subsidiary is a separate legal entity. That objection can be an-
swered in two ways. First, the idea of limited liability for shareholders
is by no means ironclad. As late as 1900, the distinction between the
liability of corporate shareholders and the liability of partners in a
partnership was more a matter of degree than of kind.237 The rela-
tively recent advent of limited shareholder liability is especially novel
in the banking238 and insurance 239 industries, which until recently im-
posed liability on shareholders in cases of economic failure. In mod-
em times, courts still "pierce the corporate veil" when necessary to
avoid an unjust result. Some commentators have suggested that this
would make courts more willing to pierce the corporate veil of the
subsidiary to reach the parent corporation;240 a recent empirical study
of reported cases, however, does not support such a claim.241 Cer-
tainly, when a corporation employs the subsidiary device as a way to
avoid "a clear legislative purpose," the courts will disregard the sepa-
rate existence of various corporate entities.242
237. Horwitz, supra note 156, at 208.
238. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Sharehold-
ers: History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 31 (1992).
239. See DODD, supra note 28, at 304-05.
240. William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate
Capita4 43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 837,873 (1982); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note
186, at 56 ("Courts' greater willingness to allow creditors to reach the assets of corporate as
opposed to personal shareholders is again consistent with economic principles."); Robert
W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEx. L. REv. 979, 992-94 (1971) ("courts are proba-
bly more willing to 'pierce the corporate veil' when the defendant is a corporation rather
than an individual"); Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and
Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589, 619 (1975) (a review of history
suggests that the idea of limited corporate liability was never intended to shield parent
corporations from obligations of subsidiary corporations).
241. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate VeiL" An Empirical Study, 76 COR-
NELL L. REv. 1036 (1991). The study actually found that of the 1,423 reported cases ana-
lyzed, courts were less likely to pierce the corporate veil of a subsidiary to reach the
corporate parent than they were to pierce the veil of a corporation to reach a shareholder
that is a natural person. Id. at 1056-57. Although the author of the study noted potential
problems with the data sample that could skew the results, id. at 1045-46, he believes that
those potential problems do not invalidate the sample or the usefulness of the data and the
conclusions drawn therefrom, id. at 1046-47.
242. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
629-30 (1983) ("the Court has consistently refused to give effect to the corporate form
where it is interposed to defeat legislative policies"); Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United
States, 326 U.S. 432, 437 (1946) ("corporate entities may be disregarded where they are
made the implement for guiding a clear legislative purpose").
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The second response is more compelling, however, because im-
posing the fiduciary duties of subsidiary directors directly on parent
corporations does not involve "piercing the veil"-it is no more than
an application of agency law. Subsidiary directors do not act indepen-
dently in the best interest of the subsidiary corporation, but instead
merely do the bidding of the parent who placed them in the director
position. Finding the parent liable for the acts of its agents does not
constitute piercing the veil and to characterize it as such misses the
point.24 3
For simplicity, the agency rule has no peer. There is no ad hoc
inquiry to undertake, no hypothetical bargain to construct, and no less
harmful alternative to consider. Simply, the subsidiary directors are
expected to do the parent's bidding and the parent pick is obliged to
pick up any other duty that the subsidiary directors would have owed.
Additionally, the rule would be economically efficient because it
would correct an externality existing in the current corporate struc-
ture. Currently, enterprises operated as corporate families enjoy too
much limited liability from the duties owed to nonshareholder constit-
uents. Consequently, the enterprise as a whole does not bear the full
cost of its activities. As a result, these enterprises seem more profita-
ble. These artificially profitable companies cause inefficient resource
allocation by attracting more investment capital than they should.24
By imposing the fiduciary costs on the parent, this imbalance will be
corrected.
Finally, such a rule will be predictable. When confronted with the
duty of a subsidiary director, one will not have to engage in any judi-
cial gymnastics, but will find instead a bright-line rule. Although-
bright line rules have a tendency to be blunt instruments incapable of
handling special cases, they at least possess the virtue of being
predictable.
Conclusion
Directors of subsidiaries find themselves in an untenable situa-
tion. They are frequently called upon to make decisions involving
what Professor Mitchell has termed "horizontal conflicts." If, in
resolving such a conflict, they make a decision that serves the interests
of the subsidiary corporation as an entity or another legitimate corpo-
rate constituency at the expense of the shareholder, they risk losing
243. See Hamilton, supra note 240, at 983-84.
244. Booth, supra note 158, at 141.
their positions on the board and liability to the shareholder for breach
of fiduciary duty. If they resolve the conflict by making a decision
that favors the shareholder, they risk being held liable by regulators
and other third parties to whom traditional corporate law may provide
a fiduciary duty. If they resign their positions, some other actors step
into the same quandary.
The idea of parent and subsidiary as separate corporate entities is
a concept that has worked well in some situations for a long time. We
must remind ourselves, however, that the idea of the corporation as a
"person" and the idea of related corporations as "parent and child"
are mere metaphors. Unlike real children, corporate subsidiaries usu-
ally do what the parent requests. The time has come for the law to
face the reality of corporate life, relieve subsidiary directors from the
charade of independence, and impose the duties that independent di-
rectors of subsidiaries should have borne directly on the parent
corporation.
While the parent-child metaphor in corporate law may be helpful,
it has its limits. As Justice Cardozo warned long ago, "[m]etaphors in
law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate
thought, they end often by enslaving it."'245 We have reached the
point where the metaphor of parent and subsidiary as independent
corporate actors has lost its usefulness, and where holding companies
should be held liable for the duties that subsidiary directors are
charged with but are unable to carry out.
245. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
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